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INTRODUCTION
Of the thirty-seven states that sanction capital punishment,' only
1. See Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Roi'da's Jurjy Override and the State
Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 924-25 n.2 (1991) (documenting status of Florida death
sentencing laws). The following states allow a death sentence only if the jury rules that the
defendant should die: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, NewJersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.; seeARK. CODE ANN. § 54-603
(Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 &
Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (1985 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -32 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 9-1 (1979 & Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.8 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN. § 413 (1987 &
Supp. 1995); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 565.032 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 279 § 68 (West 1989); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 71 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(1986 & Supp. 1995); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Baldwin 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(f)
(1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN.
§ 23A-27A-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1995); TEX. CPaM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-207 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (1990 & Supp. 1996); WvO. STAT.
§ 6-2-102 (1988).
In Nevada, a three-panel team ofjudges may impose the sentence in a capital case only if the
jury cannot agree on the proper sentence. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 175.554, 175.556 (1957 & Supp.
1995).
Only four states-Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska-authorize the judge to impose
independently death without any jury input in the sentencing process. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987); MONT. CODEANN. § 46-18-301 (1989); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-2520 (1985); see alsoKatheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality ofJury Override inAlabama
Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5. 9-10 & n.36 (1994) (summarizing status of death penalty
laws in states with capital punishment).
Only in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana do juries deliver nonbinding advice or
recommendations to the court. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994), DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 11,
§ 4209(d) (Supp. 1992), FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(2)-(3) (1993 & Supp. 1996), IND. CODE § 35-20-
2-9 (e) (1993 & Supp. 1996). Although Kentucky and Ohio both categorize the jury's sentencing
determination as a recommendation, neither state allows a trial judge to enhance a life
recommendation to a sentence of death. Mello, supra, at 925 n.2. Thus, trial judges in these
states are allowed only to soften what they believe are excessive jury recommendations. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)
(Baldwin 1987). Despite their ability to override jury recommendations of death, trial judges
in both states have rarely exercised this option. See, e.g., Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d
404, 408 (Ky. 1985) (observing that "[i]f the jury so recommends [death], almost without
exception the trial judge has followed the jury's recommendation by imposing the death
penalty").
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four provide for a jury override.2 The jury override is a unique
procedural device in capital sentencing cases that treats the jury's
sentencing verdict as a "recommendation."' The jury override gives
trial judges in capital cases the awesome power to impose death even
when the jury has concluded that life imprisonment is the proper
sentence. Generally, the override has been used in just this fash-
ion-to impose death on a capital defendant despite the jury's
recommendation that the defendant's life be spared.4
In two states, Alabama and Florida, the override has been used in
this manner with great frequency. Although Floridajuries are "death-
prone,"5 Florida trial judges have used the override 140 times to
place capital defendants on death row after jury life imprisonment
recommendations.6 In Alabama, approximately thirty percent of the
death row population is comprised of capital defendants whose jury
life recommendations were overridden by trial judges.7 Rather than
spending their lives behind bars, as their juries recommended, these
inmates have received the ultimate sanction known to man-death.
Due to the small number of persons on death row as a result ofjudicial override in Indiana
and Delaware, this Comment does not analyze their death penalty statutes. See Russell, supra,
at 11 (noting that less than 10 persons in each state have been sentenced to death by jury
overrides). Similar to Florida, both Indiana and Delaware require that trial judges attach
substantial deference to jury penalty recommendations in capital sentencing cases. See, e.g.,
Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989) (announcing that in order to
"sentence a defendant to death after jury has recommended against death, facts justifying death
sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could disagree
that death was appropriate in light of offender and his crime"); see also Pennell v. State, 604A.2d
1368, 1377 (Del. 1992) (citing Tedderstandard with approval and noting that its application was
proper in overriding case at issue); Buford v. State, 570 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
forjudge to override jury recommendation of life imprisonment and impose death penalty, life
recommendation must have been unreasonable).
2. AIA. CODE § 13A-5-47(c) (1994); DEL CODE ANN. tiL 11, § 4209(d) (1995); FLA. STAT.
ch. 921.141 (1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
3. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994) (explaining that "[w]hile the jury's
recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the
court").
4. Alabama Prison Project, AlabamaJury Override Information Sheet (July 1995). A total
of 47 prisoners have been placed on death row because of jury override in Alabama. Id.
Commentators state that in Florida, which has the third largest death row population in the
country, approximately 25% of the death row inmates were sentenced to death over a jury
recommendation of life. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting theJury. Imposition of the Death
Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1409, 1412-13 (1985) (illustrating that between 1972 and
1984,jury overrides comprised 25.7% of Florida death sentences); Russell, supra note 1, at 11.
5. Mello, supra note 1, at 925-26 (noting that between 1972, when Florida enacted jury
override, and 1988, Florida juries opted for death penalty in 526 cases).
6. Letter from Professor Michael L Radelet, to Scott Erlich, Member, The American
University Law Review (Sept. 1995) (providing Florida override statistics) (on file with The
American University Law Review).
7. See Russell, supra note 1, at 6 (relating that by 1991, 40 out of 120 inmates on Alabama
death row received jury life recommendations that were overridden by trial judges).
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In the recent case of Harris v. Alabama,' the Supreme Court
endorsed Alabama's override scheme.' After convicting Louise Harris
of murder, a jury of her peers recommended that she receive the
penalty of life imprisonment." The trial judge disagreed with the
jury and invoked the override to impose death." As a result, Louise
Harris is scheduled to die. Thus, the Supreme Court in Harris
espoused the view that one man's simple disagreement with the
decision of twelve provides a valid basis for the imposition of the
death penalty.
This Comment focuses on the capital sentencing laws of Alabama
and Florida, the two states that most frequently override jury life
recommendations) 2 Particular attention is paid to the role politics
plays in Alabama's and Florida's capital sentencing schemes. Part I
traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence."3 Part II analyzes in detail the override statutes of
Florida and Alabama. Part III discusses the recent Supreme Court
case of Hanis v. Alabama and notes that it strays from the Court's
framework for administering the death penalty. Part IV illuminates
the practical problems which pervade each of the state's statutes. It
further critiques the capital sentencing schemes of Alabama and
Florida and illustrates how each collides with the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part V discusses the political nature of
death penalty decisions and details the political pressures faced by
8. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
9. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (1995) (upholding Alabama death penalty
statute that provides trialjudges with absolute discretion to rejectjury penalty recommendations
in death penalty cases).
10. Id. at 1033. By a seven to five vote, thejury recommended that Ms. Harris be sentenced
to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Id
11. 1& Although the jury found that Ms. Harris was an avid churchgoer, worked threejobs,
and independently reared seven children, the trial judge ruled that because Ms. Harris
murdered for pecuniary gain she deserved to die, thus overriding the jury's life imprisonment
recommendation. Id.
12. See Russell, supra note 1, at 11 (describing prominent use of override in Alabama and
Florida as contrasted with limited use of override in Delaware and Indiana). Indiana and
Delaware, the two other override states, rarely have exercised the override procedure. In fact,
they have utilized the override less than 20 times combined. Id.
13. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail should not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. For
illustrations of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962) (ruling that California law
jailing anyone addicted to narcotics violated proscription on cruel and unusual punishments
because it impermissibly punished status); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (outlawing
penalty of loss of citizenship because it did not comport with basic tenets of human dignity and,
therefore, was cruel and unusual punishment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,377 (1910)
(striking down punishment of years in chains at hard labor as excessive and torturous under
Eighth Amendment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (stating that punishments of
torture and similar forms of unnecessary cruelty are forbidden by Eighth Amendment).
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judges in the capital sentencing realm. Finally, Part VI offers
recommendations to conform Alabama's and Florida's override
statutes and their application to the Court's pre-Harris Eighth
Amendment precedent.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the penalty of death
may be inflicted as a punishment for certain crimes. 4 As long as
capital punishment complies with constitutional safeguards, the Court
will not strike it down.15 Contending that the death penalty is
unconstitutional, typically capital defendants assert that the manner
in which the death penalty is administered denies them due process
and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 16  These
defendants state that the right to due process includes the right to a
fair trial and fair sentencing procedures." Capital defendants argue
that the death penalty is inherently unfair because it deprives them
of life without due process of law.1
8
In addition to Fourteenth Amendment claims, many capital
defendants also contend that the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 9 Mostly, the
Supreme Court has blended the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
arguments together and analyzed them in a three-part inquiry.
20
First, the Court asks whether the punishment of death comports with
14. SeeJOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.3, at 492 (4th
ed. 1991) (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976),Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976),
Spazlano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985)).
15. Id. (noting that death penalty must be imposed in setting that provides for procedural
safeguards to protect against violations of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and
to comply with Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments).
16. U.S. CONT. amend XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ... " Id.
Because a capital defendant risks loss of life, a capital defendant's trial and sentencing
procedures must comply with the due process obligations of the Fourteenth Amendment. REx
E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1981).
17. See Rebecca A. Rafferty, In the Shadow ofMcClesky v. Kemp: The Discriminatory Impact of
the Death Sentencing Process, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 271, 281 (1995)
(relating that right of due process includes right to fair and impartial hearing, trial, and
sentencing process).
18. See id. at 282 (recounting due process arguments made to overturn death sentences).
19. SeeJohn Christopher Johnson, Note, When Life Means Lifre Juries, Parole; and Capital
Sentencing, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1211, 1224-25 (1995) (analyzing Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
arguments against death penalty and asserting that "the Eighth Amendment has been the
Court's primary tool in regulating the death penalty").
20. SeeJeffreyAllan Welleck, Supreme Court Review: Eighth Amendment-Tral Court May Impose
Death Sentence Despite Jury's Recommendation of Life Imprisonment: Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct.
3154 (1984), 75J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 813, 814 (1984) (discussing framework for analyzing
death penalty cases in light of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attacks).
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community values and evolving standards of decency.2" Second, the
Justices determine whether the sentence is proportionate to the
offense for which it is given.22 Last, the Court scrutinizes each death
sentence to ensure it was administered in a non-arbitrary manner.
23
Under the common law, jurors were required to impose death on
all convicted felons.24 This rigid procedure led to widespread jury
nullification.' Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a
defendant regardless of the strength of evidence against him.26
Because of the inflexibility of the common law, many jurors acquitted
otherwise guilty capital defendants in order to circumvent the
automatic death sentence that accompanied a conviction.2 1 This
motivated most states to abolish mandatory death statutes and replace
them with statutes conferring complete, unguided discretion in the
hands of capital juries to impose the appropriate sentence.2
The constitutionality of unguided capital juror discretion statutes
was first addressed by the Supreme Court in McGautha v. California.29
In this case, two defendants, McGautha and Wilkinson, together
robbed two different shops on the same day." During the second
robbery, Wilkinson punched one clerk while McGautha shot and
killed another clerk." Both men were convicted of armed robbery
and first degree murder.12 In the penalty phase of the trial, the
same jury sentenced McGautha to death and Wilkinson to life
imprisonment."3 In his instructions to the jury regarding their
choice of life imprisonment or death, the judge stated that the jurors
were "entirely free to act on their own judgment, conscience, and
absolute discretion. " ' In addition, the judge acknowledged that the




24. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971) (discussing rigidity and
unworkability of common law rule requiring that all convicted felons receive automatic death
sentence).
25. I&
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231-32 (6th ed. 1990).
27. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199.
28. Id. at 199-202.
29. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), afflgPeople v. McGautha, 452 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1969).
30. Id. at 187.
31. Id-
32. I at 185.
33. Id
34. Id. at 189-90.
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tion.' The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
McGautha's conviction and death sentence."6
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, McGautha claimed that
California's death penalty procedure was unconstitutional because it
failed to provide any standards to guide the jury's discretion in its
choice of penalty." McGautha asserted that this unguided discretion
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of life without
due process of law. In denying petitioner McGautha's claims, the
Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, held that unbridled jury
discretion passed constitutional muster.3 9 Justice Harlan, writing for
the majority, focused on the difficulty of drafting a death penalty
statute that meaningfully guided the sentencer's discretion. ° Such
a statute would need to encompass, in advance, those characteristics
of murders and their perpetrators that are deserving of the death
penalty." Noting that "history reveals continual efforts, uniformly
unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those homicides for which the
slayer should die,"' Justice Harlan concluded that it was impossible
to clearly and understandably formulate a death penalty statute that
guided sentencers' discretion.43 Because there were no intelligible
means of channeling jury discretion, the Court ruled that committing
to the jury the unbridled authority to prescribe life or death in capital
cases was not repugnant to any constitutional provision."
Just one year after McGautha, in the landmark case of Furman v.
Georgia,' the Supreme Court effectively overruled the law of Mc-
Gautha,46 and, for the first time, explicitly ruled on the constitution-
35. Id. at 190 (recounting jury instructions that stated that "the law itself provides no
standard for the guidance of the jury in the selection of the penalty, but rather, commits the
whole matter... to the ... absolute discretion of the jury").
36. Id. at 191.
37. Id. at 196.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 207 (ruling that complete jury discretion is "not offensive to anything in the
Constitution").
40. Id. at 204 (arguing that task of channeling capital sentencing discretion is "beyond
present human ability"). For a thorough analysis of the holding in McGautha, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1972) (Douglas,J., concurring).
41. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 204.
42. Id. at 197.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 207.
45. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
46. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n.11 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing tension between Furman decision and McGautha holding and reasoning that Furman
essentially adheres to Justice Brennan's dissent in McGautha, which bolsters argument that
McGautha is essentially overruled).
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ality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.4  In a
single swoop, the Court invalidated the death penalty laws of thirty-
nine jurisdictions and reversed more than 600 death sentences. 8
In Furman, three petitioners, one from Texas and two from
Georgia, challenged the capital sentencing statutes in their respective
states.49 Like the statutes in McGautha, these statutes vested absolute
discretion in sentencers to determine a capital defendant's punish-
ment, but provided no guidance or standards to properly channel the
sentencer's penalty decision." The Court in Furman held5 that the
states' death penalty laws were constitutionally infirm as applied under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.5" The
Court felt that the ultimate sanction was being imposed in an
47. See id. at 314 (Marshall,J., concurring) (framing issue as whether death penalty is cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by Eighth Amendment); Kathleen D. Weron, Comment,
Rethinking Utah's Death Penalty Statute: A Constitutional Requirement for the Narrowing ofAggravating
Circumstances, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1107, 1108. The Eighth Amendment's proscription of"cruel
and unusual punishments," which originated in the English Bill of Rights, was focused on
eliminating the myriad of ghastly punishments inflicted on criminal defendants in England.
Nicholas John Spinelli, Eighth Amendment-From Cruelly Restrictive to Unusually Broad Protections
Against Punishments-Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992), 3 SarON HALL CONST. L.J.
607, 608 & n.17 (1993). Most historians believe that in borrowing this precise language from
the English Bill of Rights, our Founding Fathers sought to prevent barbarism and torture. Id.
48. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Colloquy, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CAsE W. REs. L, REv.
1047, 1056 (1991) (describing how retroactive application of Furman decision took hundreds of
condemned inmates off death row).
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. The two Georgian petitioners were sentenced to death for
murder and rape, respectively. The Texan petitioner was sentenced to die for rape. Id.
50. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that in cases before Court, decision to
impose death was left to absolute discretion of sentencers).
51. Furman is a brief per curiam opinion, holding that "the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 240.
In Furman, everyJustice filed an opinion. The plurality,Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Powell,
form the holding of the Court because their opinions represented "that position taken by those
members of the Court who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (summarizing Furman decision). This created some
confusion because none of the plurality Justices joined the others' opinions. Five Justices
supported the per curiam opinion. Id. Moreover, each of the five filed concurrences to explain
their views. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall contended that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-06, 371 (Brennan, J., per curiam). Justice Douglas
argued that the death penalty was constitutionally infirm as applied because it was riddled with
discrimination. Id. at 255-56 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart also believed that the
penalty was unconstitutional as applied because of the "freakish" and "wanton" manner in which
it was imposed. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Focusing on the rarity of its use, Justice
White argued that the death penalty was pointless. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). The
dissent, authored by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist,
maintained that the application of the death penalty in the cases before the Court survived
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 375 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40; see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Death Penalty: A National
Question, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 867,869 (1985). Professor Black posited that because there were
no sentencing guidelines under the existing capital sentencing statutes, there was no controlling
law and, thus, there could be no due process of law accorded to capital defendants. Id.
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arbitrary manner." Arbitrary imposition of the death penalty ran
counter to the Court's belief that because death is different from all
other punishments, courts were required to accord heightened
scrutiny to the procedures followed in its imposition. 4
The Court disliked that the sentencer in capital cases possessed the
unguided discretion to impose the death penalty whenever it was an
available punishment.55 In situations where the defendant was
eligible for the death penalty, there was no reliable way to differenti-
ate cases in which death would be imposed from cases in which it
would not. The Court recognized that the death penalty arbitrarily
produced too great a variance between those capital defendants who
53. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas,J., concurring) (discussing arbitrariness that some
tribunals employ in inflicting death penalty).
[We deal with a system ofjustice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion ofjudges
or juries the determination whether defendants ... should die or be imprisoned.
Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.
I& (Douglas,J., concurring); see id. at 293 (DouglasJ., concurring) ("When the punishment of
death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available ... it is being
inflicted arbitrarily... [and] smacks of little more than a lottery system"); id- at 257 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (categorizing current death penalty statutes as "pregnant with discrimination,"
and stating that this discrimination did not comport with "idea of equal protection of the laws
that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments'"); id- at 364 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (noting that "capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily against certain
identifiable classes of people ... [,] usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the
member of [a] minority group... who becomes society's sacrificial lamb"); id- at 310 (Stewart
J., concurring) (analogizing application of death penalty to being struck by lightning and
arguing that we "cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed").
54. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 ("I do not concede that whatever process is 'due' an
offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the
constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no means novel.... nor is it negligible,
being literally that between life and death.") (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan,J., concurring)); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329
(1985) (reversing imposition of death sentence because jury felt imposition of capital
punishment would be evaluated by anotherjudicial body and not administered as result of their
findings); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1983) (requiring high threshold of reliability
before imposing death penalty); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (discussing death's finality and
uniqueness in that it is an "absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity") (Stewart, J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
("Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment.").
The decision to exercise the power of the state to execute a defendant is unlike any
other decision citizens and public officials are called on to make. Evolving standards
of decency have imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the
determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 306.
55. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (taking issue with total discretion vested in sentencers to
impose death penalty).
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were spared and those who were sentenced to death. 6 For example,
some murderers who committed less atrocious crimes or who were
less morally culpable were sentenced to die, while others who were
seemingly more culpable and acted more egregiously had their lives
spared. 7 Moreover, the Justices acknowledged that racial discrimina-
tion played a significant role in the administration of the death
penalty."8 Justice Douglas noted that "'[i]n several instances where
a white and a[n] [African American] were co-defendants, the white
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term for years,
and the [African American] was given the death penalty."'' 9 These
findings led the Supreme Court in Furman to conclude that when a
sentencer is granted the power to determine whether a fellow human
being should live, that sentencer's discretion must be properly
channeled and guided so as to minimize the risk that death will be
imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.'
Although the Court in Furman invalidated the death penalty laws of
every state, it did not rule that the death penalty was unconstitutional
per se.61 Therefore, the states had the opportunity to re-draft their
statutes to conform to Furman.2 Because each of the nine Justices
56. See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (noting that arbitrariness of death penalty was
reflected by courts' inability to "distinguish the few cases in which [the death penalty was)
imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not"); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(relating that Furman petitioners were "among a capriciously selected, random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed"). Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Merny:
Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1037, 1048
(1985) (discussing inability to reconcile similar criminal conduct and convictions with dissimilar
sentences).
57. Gillers, supra note 56, at 1048 (describing how Court in Furman was disgusted with
application of current death penalty because it led to imposition of death sentences for widely
disproportionate crimes).
58. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (noting disparity in death penalty sentences between black
and white co-defendants).
59. Id. (Douglas,J., concurring) (quoting Rupert C. Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas,
1924-68, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 132, 141 (1969)). See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328
(1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (warning that when race is considered by sentencers in capital
cases risk of capricious decisionmaking infects process so as to render imposition of death
antithetical to our constitutional tenets).
60. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (indicating that when death is not
imposed according to meaningful criteria penalty is employed arbitrarily); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 154 (1976) (highlighting Furman mandate that capital sentencers' discretion be
channelled so as to reduce risk of capricious death sentences).
61. See, e.g.,Alan I. BigelJustice William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall on CapitalPunishment:
Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and Inteprtation by the Court, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLV 11, 66 (1995) (explaining that in limiting its decision to jury pronounce-
ments "in these cases," Court avoided holding that capital punishment was per se unconstitution-
al); Rafferty, supra note 17, at 287 (enunciating that although Court invalidated all existent
death penalty statutes, it specifically allowed States option to create post-Furman death penalty
statutes that would comply with constitutional requirements).
62. See Rafferty, supra note 17, at 287 (contending that Furman gave states options of
creating "mandatory death sentences for crimes carefully defined by statute; develop[ing]
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filed a separate opinion, the states had difficulty gleaning exactly what
the Supreme Court was looking for in Furman.6 The states could be
certain of one thing-unlimited discretion was intolerable because it
enabled sentencers to inflict death arbitrarily. Did this mean that the
states should create mandatory capital punishment statutes so as to
remove discretion from the process altogether? Or, should the states
seek to do what the Court in McGautha thought was humanly
impossible-establish guidelines by which sentencers could properly
decide when to administer the death penalty?
After Furman, thirty-five states revised their death penalty statutes by
decreasing sentencers' discretion in an attempt to minimize the
arbitrariness of the decision to impose death.' These revisions took
two forms. The first, adhered to by ten states, entailed mandatory
death sentences whereby the sentencer's discretion was eliminated
entirely.66 These mandatory statutes envisioned automatic death
sentences for certain specified forms of murder.
6 7
The second type of revised statute, enacted by twenty-five states,
established a bifurcated proceeding that required sentencers to
analyze certain specified aggravating and mitigating factors in a
separate hearing after they convicted the defendant of a capital
crime.' Most of these statutes required capital sentencers to find at
least one out of a list of statutorily provided aggravating factors
attached to the defendant's crime before they could impose the death
penalty.6 9 Aggravating factors are circumstances that make the crime
guidelines to standardize jury discretion; and outright abolition").
63. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penaly as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873, 874 (1985) (observing that nine opinions in Furman created "utter
disarray," and that Furman did little to clarify unsettled status of death penalty laws). Along the
same lines, ChiefJustice Burger, speaking of the "less than self defining" nature of the Eighth
Amendment's language, stated that the Furman opinions "reveal[ed] the haze that surround [ed]
this constitutional command." Furman, 408 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, Cj., dissenting). As
Professor Bedau noted, "those who had hoped that the Court would dispel this haze and provide
new and useful tools which might be used to help the unenlightened jury to see why the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment... found Furman disappointing." Bedau, supra, at 874.
64. See Weron, supra note 47, at 1122 (analyzing states' choices regarding redrafting death
penalty statutes in wake of Furman).
65. Bigel, supra note 61, at 66. For a list of the states that re-drafted their capital sentencing
statutes in response to Furman, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976).
66. See Bigel, supra note 61, at 67 (discussing that mandatory statutes sought to eliminate
possibility of arbitrary imposition of death penalty).
67. See Bigel, supra note 61, at 67-68.
68. SeeWeron, supra note 47, at 1112-13 (discussing guided discretion statutes that limited
sentencer discretion).
69. See, ag., AlA. CODE § 13A-5-45(f) (1994) (providing that sentencer must find that
minimum of one aggravating factor exists in order to invoke death penalty); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995) (same). See also infra notes 111 and 160 (providing
statutory aggravating factors for Florida and Alabama, respectively). Two statutory aggravators
common to both states are: (1) committing the murder for pecuniary gain and (2) committing
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and the criminal seem more culpable if they are found to exist.
70
Aggravating factors force the sentencer to ask questions about the
crime to determine whether the defendant has a prior felony record,
killed for money, or killed in such a way as to subject several people
to grave danger.7'
Under this type of statute, aggravating factors were weighed against
those factors in mitigation of a death sentence. Mitigating circum-
stances require the sentencer to examine the totality of the circum-
stances in which the crime was committed. Sentencers analyze
whether the defendant was provoked, mentally impaired, or acted
under the domination of another when determining the proper
sentence to impose.7 2 Statutes consisting of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors were aptly called "guided discretion statutes" because,
through the mechanism of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
they provided sentencers with guidance as to when to impose the
death penalty.
73
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court was called upon to pass on the
validity of the states' attempts to conform their death penalty statutes
to Furman's unclear requirements.74  In Gregg v. Georgia7v and its
companion cases, the Supreme Court upheld the guided discretion
statutes of Georgia,7 6 Texas,7 7 and Florida,7 ' but struck down the
mandatory death schemes of Louisiana79 and North Carolina.0
In Woodson v. North Carolinas' and Roberts v. Louisiana2 the Court
explained that the mandatory death sentences embodied in these
the murder while under a life imprisonment sentence. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (Harrison
1991); AlA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994).
70. See Bedau, supra note 63, at 1090 (describing how additional factors or conduct of
defendant can increase defendant's culpability).
71. See infra note 160 (listing eight aggravating factors in current Alabama death penalty
statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1994)).
72. See infra note 160 (providing seven mitigating factors in current Alabama death penalty
statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994)).
73. See Weron, supra note 47, at 1113 (alluding to states' attempts to dispense greater
guidance to capital sentencing bodies).
74. See Bedau, supra note 63 (discussing confusion spawned by Furman "holding").
75. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
76. Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (upholding Georgia statute that resulted in
"freakish" results after proper judicial review).
77. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding Texas statute requiring that jury
consider five categories of aggravating factors and circumstances along with mitigating factors).
78. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (upholding as constitutional statutory
requirement of state supreme court review).
79. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (reversing mandatory death penalty
statute that provided no room for jury to consider mitigating circumstances).
80. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304-05 (1976) (reversing death penalty statute
because it failed to provide objective standards to preclude arbitrary and wantonjury decisions).
81. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
82. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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states' statutes were impermissible because they precluded sentencers
from taking the individual and the circumstances surrounding his
offense into account.8 3 This lack of individualized consideration did
not comport with the notion that capital defendants must receive
individualized treatment in the sentencing process because death is
different in kind from any other punishment." In sum, because
mandatory sentencing schemes prevented consideration of "the
character and record of the individual offender," they were unconsti-
tutional under the Eighth Amendment.'u
In contrast to the mandatory capital sentencing schemes discussed
above, the Court approved the guided discretion statutes of Georgia,
Texas, and Florida."8 These statutes possessed two common threads.
First, they provided for bifurcated proceedings87 in which guilt or
innocence would be determined in the first stage, and penalty in the
second.'u Second, they required that in order to impose death, at
least one out of a statutorily prescribed list of aggravating factors must
exist in each capital defendant's case. 9
In Gregg, the petitioners argued that Georgia's revamped guided
discretion capital punishment statute90 was unconstitutional because
83. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 332-36 (1976). The Supreme Court took issue with the mandatory statute because it
"treat[ed] all persons convicted of a given offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death." Id. at 304. Moreover, the Court reasoned that by ignoring the various facets
of the individual's character and the circumstances of the offense, mandatory statutes
"exclude[d] from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassion or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind." Id.
84. Id. at 298-305 (discussing how individual traits, circumstances, and conditions should
be considered). A mandatory death sentence would be "regressive and of an antique mold."
Id. at 298.
85. Id. at 303-05.
86. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 252 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
87. The Court in Gregg explained that bifurcated proceedings were necessary in capital
sentencing cases in order to separate information prejudicial to the issue of the defendant's guilt
but relevant to the issue of the proper penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. The Court asserted,
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have information prejudicial to
the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a
rational sentence, a bifurcated [proceeding] is more likely to ensure elimination of the
constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
Id. at 191-92; see also Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-CapitalJurors Who Change Their Minds About the
Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. LJ. 1183, 1187 (1995) (contending
that if courts adhere to rules of evidence, bifurcated proceedings will prevent prejudicial
information regarding sentence from tainting question of guilt).
88. Pro4tt, 428 U.S. at 245-46;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158.
89. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.6;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995). This statute retained the death
penalty for six crimes. Id. (listing aircraft hijacking, treason, murder, rape, armed robbery and
kidnapping as offenses which allow imposition of death sentence). It entails a bifurcated
proceeding, with guilt or innocence being decided in the initial stage. Id. If guilt is found, the
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Americans' standards of decency" had evolved to the point where
capital punishment could no longer be tolerated.2 Looking to
"objective indicia" of the public's opinion on the death penalty, the
Court concluded that the petitioners' argument must fail.93 Alluding
to the swiftness with which the vast majority of the states redrafted
their capital sentencing statutes to rectify the inadequacies identified
in Furman, the Court's plurality held that Americans' standards of
decency had not evolved to such a degree as to warrant abolition of
the death penalty.94
The Court in Gregg concluded that Georgia's death penalty statute
satisfied Furman's central concern that death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.95  This was accomplished through
procedures that focused the jury's attention on the specifics of the
crime. In weighing the existence or nonexistence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the jury was forced to answer meaningful
sentencing portion of the trial begins. The judge must consider or include in his instructions
to the jury the duty to take into account any mitigating circumstances and any of the 10
statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances authorized by law or supported by the evidence.
Id. The sentencer is thus free to consider an infinite number of statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, together with any statutory aggravating factors. Id. Only when the
sentencer has found at least one of the statutorily prescribed aggravating factors, elects death
as the appropriate sentence, and specifies the aggravating circumstance(s) in writing, may a
defendant be sentenced to die. Id. Further, the jury recommendation is binding on the court.
I& Finally, Georgia set up an automatic appeal process whereby a defendant scheduled to die
receives automatic review from Georgia's Supreme Court. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court is
statutorily bound to check the record for bias and prejudice, and to do a proportionality test
to determine whether the sentence of death was disproportionate to the sentence imposed in
factually similar cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35.1 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995).
91. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The theory is that if a punishment fails to
comport with current standards of decency, then it runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments. Id. In Trop, the defendant was convicted of war-time
desertion and received the sentence of expatriation, meaning loss of citizenship. Remarking
that the cruel and unusual punishments clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of human decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Chief'Justice Warren
ruled that this punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 101. Thus, as Justice
Marshall has explained, adherence to the evolving standards of decency yardstick means that a
sanction that was allowed at one time in our nation's past "is not necessarily permissible today."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. Furman, 408 U.S. at 329.
93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 (stating that "[petitioners... renew the 'standards of decency'
argument, but developments during the four years since Furman have undercut substantially the
assumptions upon which their argument rest[s]").
94. Id at 170-81 (recounting that society has endorsed death penalty through numerous
codifications).
The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty.., is the
legislative response to Furman. ... [Thirty-five] states have enacted new statutes that
provide for the death penalty.... [In addition,] the Congress ... [has] enacted a
statute providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy.... [Therefore,] all of the post-
Furman statutes make dear that capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the
elected representatives of the people.
Id a
95. Id. at 195 (emphasizing that objective standards are key to constitutionality).
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questions in its deliberations regarding the proper sentence to
impose.96 If a minimum of one aggravating circumstance were not
linked to a particular defendant, that defendant could not be
sentenced to die.97 The statute, therefore, permissibly limited the
class of defendants eligible to receive the death penalty. While jury
discretion remained, the Court concluded that it was adequately
"controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-
discriminatory application."" Furthermore, the Court in Gregg noted
that by requiring sentencers to weigh aggravating and mitigating
factors, Georgia's statute struck a near-perfect balance; it allowed
jurors to retain substantial discretion, while simultaneously channeling
and focusing that discretion.99 In addition, Georgia's capital statute
directed sentencers to consider the particular attributes of the
accused."°  Unlike the mandatory statutes, the guided discretion
statutes required the sentencer to "consider the circumstances of the
crime and the criminal before ... render[ing] a sentence."
101
Moreover, unlike the rigid mandatory sentence statutes, jurors, under
the guided statutes, had the option of refraining from imposing death
even after convicting the defendant of a capital crime." 2
In sum, Gregg and its companion cases formulate the foundation of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence as to how the death penalty may
be imposed within the parameters of the Eighth Amendment. °" If
the sentencer's discretion is adequately channeled and confined, and
the focus of the sentencer's inquiry is on the individual characteristics
of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding his offense, the
96. Id. at 197. Examples of these questions are the following: "Was [the crime] committed
in the course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon
a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way or in a
manner that endangered the lives of many persons? Does [the defendant] have a record of
prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special facts about this defendant that
militate against imposing capital punishment?" GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1995).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995).
98. Grng, 428 U.S. at 198.
99. Id at 196-98.
100. Id at 198.
101. Higginbotham, supra note 48, at 1056.
102. SeelBigel, supranote 61, at 12 (commenting that capricious sentencing is fostered under
mandatory statute where jurors may circumvent mandate to impose death penalty by acquitting
otherwise guilty capital defendant ifjurors believe defendant does not deserve to die).
103. In the years after Gregg the Supreme Court has refined the administration of the death
penalty. Se4 g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (abolishing death sentence for
accomplice to felony murder who does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death sentence for rape of adult
woman was grossly disproportionate punishment violative of Eighth Amendment); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (ruling that sentencer must be permitted to consider all possible
mitigating circumstances proffered by defendant and notjust those mitigating factors statutorily
prescribed).
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imposition of death is constitutional. As long as "discretion [was]
channeled," the belief was that a sentencer can "[n]o longer ...
wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence." 4 The Court
in Gregg believed that the arbitrariness and capriciousness that
permeated the death penalty could be minimized to an acceptable
level by such procedures."0 5
II. THE OVERRIDE STATUTES
A. Florida's Death Penalty Statute
Florida's capital sentencing statute 05 was redrafted in 1973 to
comport with the Court's 1972 ruling in Furman.°7 The revised
statute contains a bifurcated proceeding. Once a defendant is found
guilty of a capital offense,'"u a separate hearing is held before the
same judge and jury to decide the appropriate sentence." At this
evidentiary hearing, both sides are given an opportunity to present
evidence and argue whether death should be imposed." 0 Upon the
104. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
105. Id, at 193-95.
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Harrison 1991).
107. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating FiA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082,
921.141 (Harrison 1971), Florida's prior death penalty statute); see Michael Mello & Ruthann
RobsonJudge overJury: Florida's Practice of lmposing Death over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. Rnv. 31, 35 (1985) (discussing Florida's post-Furman death penalty statute and reasons for
invalidation of pre-Furman statute). Florida's pre-Furman statute was called a mercy statute
because it required that all persons convicted of a capital offense receive the penalty of death
unless the jury recommended mercy. Id. Ajury mercy recommendation was binding on the
trialjudge. Id. at 36. The statute was struck down because it failed to guide or structure the
jury's decision whether to recommend mercy. Id. Thus, it did not comport with Furman in that
the sentencer's discretion under the mercy statute was not adequately guided to minimize the
risk of arbitrary imposition of death. Id.
108. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (Harrison 1991). Under Florida's statute, only those
criminals convicted of first-degree murder are eligible for the sanction of death. Id. The
murder statute reads in relevant part:
(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being, 1. When perpetrated from a premeditat-
ed design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being; or 2. When
committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,
any... b. arson, c. sexual battery, d. robbery, e. burglary, f. kidnapping, g. escape
h. aggravated child abuse, i. aircraft piracy, or j. unlawful throwing, placing, or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb; or 3. Which resulted from the unlawful
distribution of... cocaine.. or opium.. by a person 18 years of age or older when
such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, is murder in
the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082.
Id.
109. F.A. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (Harrison 1991). SeeProffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-
51 (1976) (providing concise description of Florida's sentencing procedure); see also Mello &
Robson, supra note 107, at 36-37 (same).
110. SeeMello &Robson, supranote 107, at 36 (contending that "many trial procedures have
been imported" into this penalty phase). Both sides can enter into evidence matter that relates
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hearing's conclusion, the jury is directed to determine "[w]hether
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist ... which outweigh the
aggravating circumstances found to exist; and ... [b]ased on these
considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death."' The jury's sentencing verdict is by
majority vote," 2 and is only advisory and not binding on the
court.
113
After the jury gives its advice, the statute directs the trial judge to
weigh independently the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances" 4 and arrive at the proper sentence." 5 After receiv-
to any of the statutorily prescribed aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. This second
phase is essentially a trial on the issue of penalty. I.
111. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (Harrison 1991). To reach a death vote, a majority of the
jury must find that at least one of the following aggravating factors exists:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (c) The defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons. (d) The capital felony was committed
while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any robbery,
sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. (e) The capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from custody. (f) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain. (g)
The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Id. § 921.141(5).
If at least one of these aggravating circumstances is found to exist, the jury must determine
whether any of the following mitigating circumstances exist and, if any do exist, whether they
outweigh the aggravating factors found. Id. § 921.141(6). The mitigating factors are:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (b) The capital
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
emotional or mental disturbance. (c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's
conduct or consented to the act. (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital
felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. (e)
The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person. (0 The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially
impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id
112. Although the statute declares that the jury's vote must be by majority, a 6-8 deadlock
is construed to be a life imprisonment recommendation. See, e.g., Mello, supra note 1, at 928
n.22 (listing cases in which split vote translated into life recommendations); Mello & Robson,
supra note 107, at 36 n.26 (same).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (Harrison 1991). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of the jury, the court, after [independent-
ly re-] weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances," enters a sentence of life or death.
Id.
114. Id. The statute has been interpreted to mean that the judge need not independently
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in one circumstance-when following the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment. See, e.g., Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 36 ("If the
sentence is death, or if the judge imposes a life sentence despite the jury's recommendation of
death, the court must set forth.. . aggravating and mitigating circumstances."). Thus, whenever
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ing the jury's recommendation, the trial judge possesses the authority
to weigh individually aggravating and mitigating factors and impose
either life imprisonment or death.116 Whenever the judge's sanction
is death, the Florida Supreme Court grants automatic review to
determine whether the death sentence was appropriate."
7
B. Case Law Interpreting Flrida's Capital Sentencing Statute
As previously discussed, a capital sentencing statute will be upheld
if it successfully channels and guides the sentencer's discretion by
focusing the penalty inquiry on the defendant's background and
character, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances surround-
ing the case."' Florida's capital statute differs from most states'
death penalty statutes in that it includes an override provision that
allows the trial judge to veto the jury's penalty recommendation." 9
Nonetheless, it has consistently been upheld in both the United States
and Florida Supreme Courts. 2
The key case for reconciling the Florida statute with the Supreme
Court's strictures is Tedder v. State. ' The petitioner in Tedder was
convicted of first degree murder for killing his ex-wife's mother.'22
The Florida Supreme Court found that petitioner had snuck out from
behind a tree and shot toward his ex-wife and her mother, who were
the sentence is death or the judge lessens the jury's advisory death sentence to life, the judge
must provide written findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. The mandate that
judges provide written findings when lessening a death recommendation to a sentence of life
imprisonment is explained in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied sub no.
Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (Harrison 1991), requires the judge, when imposing
death, to "set forth in writing [the] findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the
facts: (a) [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist ... and (b) [t]hat there are
insufficient mitigating circumstances... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." rd.
116. Id.
117. F A. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (Harrison 1991); see Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 10 (commenting
that appellate review ensures "that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in one case
will reach a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in another case ...
[because] this Court can review that case in light of the other decisions and determine whether
or not the punishment is too great"); Welleck, supra note 20, at 821 (stating that "the [trial]
judge's determination is then reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial judge are supported by the evidence
and justify a sentence of death").
118. See supra notes 45-105 and accompanying text (discussing Court's holdings and
rationales in Furman, Gregg, and their progeny).
119. Of the 39 states that endorse capital punishment, only Florida, Alabama, Indiana, and
Delaware possess jury override provisions. See Russell, supra note 1, at 10 & n.52 (alluding to
uniqueness of statutes and providing that Indiana has used override less than 10 times and
Delaware has never used override to impose death over jury recommendation of life).
120. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1976); Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
121. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1976).
122. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1976).
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gardening forty yards away from the petitioner.12  Petitioner's
gunshot struck the mother, who fell to the ground.1 24  Petitioner
made matters worse by running toward the scene and grabbing his ex-
wife, thereby preventing her from assisting her injured mother.
2
-
The mother died from her wound one month after the shooting.
12
6
On these facts, the jury deliberated for sixteen minutes and recom-
mended a sentence of life imprisonment.1
21
The next day the trial judge conducted a hearing to determine his
sentence recommendation. 28  Finding one mitigating and three
aggravating circumstances, the judge overrode the jury's life imprison-
ment recommendation and imposed the death penalty.129  As
neither the statute nor the case law required the judge to attach any
weight to the jury's recommendation, he could disregard the jury's
recommendation provided he found at least one aggravating circum-
stance. 3 0 Because he found at least one aggravating factor, the trial
judge was free to enter a sentence of death. Because the death
penalty was imposed, the case was automatically reviewed by the
Florida Supreme Court.'
The Florida Supreme Court set a new statewide precedent by ruling
that in order for a trial judge to impose death over ajury recommen-
dation of life, "the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."3 2 Thus, under what has come to be known as the Tedder
standard,' Florida trial judges were now obligated to ascribe great
weight to a capital jury's recommended sentence. 4 Applying this
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (explaining that petitioner physically took ex-wife away from site of murder).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 909-10. The judge received a pre-sentence investigation report to assist him in
his penalty decision. Id. This report included information that the jury was not aware of, such
as a history of petitioner's criminal background. See id. (stating that petitioner had one prior
conviction of petit larceny).
129. Id. at 909-10 (stating three aggravating circumstances: (1) knowingly creating risk of
death for many persons, (2) murder committed while defendant attempting kidnapping, and
(8) crime "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel").
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3), (5) (Harrison 1991) (providing that trial judge is
precluded from imposing death unless he finds at least one aggravating circumstance).
131. Florida's capital statute provides for automatic state supreme court review of all death
sentences. Id. § 921.141(4).
132. Teddr, 322 So. 2d at 910.
133. See, e.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 640 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1994) (discussing "the trial
judge's application of the Tedder standard"); Christmas v. State, 632 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (1994)
(discussing whether Tedder standard had been met); Russell, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing
application of Tedder standard in Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984)).
134. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
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standard in Tedder for the first time to the facts, the court ruled that
the death penalty did not comport with petitioner's crime.135
Reasoning that the Florida legislature intended that the death penalty
apply only to the most cruel killings, the court commented that
although petitioner's act was "atrocious," it did not warrant the death
penalty 3 6 Consequently, the court quashed the death sentence and
ordered the trial judge to reinstate thejury's recommended sentence
of life imprisonment.137
The Teddrstandard played a crucial role in the first Supreme Court
case to deal expressly with the constitutionality of the jury override.
In the 1976 case of Proffitt v. Florida,38 the petitioner contended
that the jury override smacked of the very arbitrariness and unbridled
discretion against which Furman had warned.' The crux of peti-
tioner's argument was that because Florida's death penalty statute was
silent as to the weight the trial judge must accord the jury's recom-
mended sentence,140 it ran afoul of Furman's teachings.' The
Court, however, was unpersuaded by petitioner's argument. The
Court held that Florida's judicially created Tedderstandard sought "to
assure that the death penalty [would] not be imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner."1'4  Therefore, the Supreme Court did not
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id. at 910-11 (contending that there was no reason for trial judge to override jury's life
sentence recommendation).
138. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
139. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976).
140. See Mello, supra note 1, at 30 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 63-64, Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976)) (arguing that "jury's advisory sentencing verdict introduces unnecessary
discretion into the sentencing procedure because the statute gives no guidance regarding its
relevance"). Further, the brief argues that "[t]he verdict is merely an enigmatic statement that
the jury recommended life or death [because t]he basis for the recommendation need not be
given." Id.; Russell, supra note 1, at 12 (characterizing petitioner's argument as attack on
statutory guidelines that "neither tailored nor prescribed how the jury's advisory verdict was to
be weighed").
141. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (providing detailed discussion of Furman).
142. Proffitt 428 U.S. at 252-53. The Court also praised Florida's appellate review of death
overrides. Id. at 253. Florida's Supreme Court "has not hesitated to vacate a death sentence
when it has determined that the sentence should not have been imposed." Id. Further, the
Court noted that the Florida Supreme Court "has vacated 8 of the 21 death sentences it has
reviewed to date." Id. The Court was convinced that Florida had done its best to ensure that
the irrevocable penalty of death was not imposed in a "freakish" manner. Id
The Court also followed the line of reasoning enunciated in Dixon, i.e., that trial judges are
more experienced in sentencing than juries. Id. at 252. ThusJustice Powell, announcing the
judgment of the Court, proclaimed, "judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment .... " Id. But see
Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3167-68 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that
because punishment of death "cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally
understand such rules," death can only be understood to represent community's outrage, and
thus should be imposed by ajury, "rather than by a single governmental official"); Mello, supra
note 1, at 936-37 (relating that as of 1990, 83 out of 112 life-to-death overrides were reversed on
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agree that the override tainted Florida's capital procedure with the
element of unlawful arbitrariness.
In Spaziano v. Florida,'" the second case to address Florida's
override procedure, the Supreme Court expressly upheld the
constitutionality of Florida's jury override provision." The convict-
ed petitioner in Spaziano asserted that the justification behind the
death penalty was mainly retribution." Because retribution was
essentially society's expression of moral outrage, the petitioner argued
that juries comprising a cross section of the community were more
capable than judges of expressing the community's position on
whether a capital defendant deserved to be put to death."7
The Court rejected petitioner's reasoning and declared Florida's
law constitutional." First, the Court disagreed that the sole justifi-
cation for the death penalty was retribution.' 9  Second, the Court
maintained that even if retribution were the primary purpose behind
the death penalty, this would not mandate jury sentencing in all
automatic appeal by Florida's Supreme Court). Welleck, supra note 20, at 834 (revealing 1980
study showing that average Florida trial judge made only three capital sentencing decisions in
seven-year existence of new statute). These facts tear gaping holes in the rationale thatjudges
should possess capital sentencing authority because of their wide ranging sentencing expertise.
143. See Mello, supra note 1, at 930 (relating Court's finding that override did not spawn
capricious imposition of death).
144. 468 U.S. 447 (1984). Ajury convicted the petitioner of first degree murder. Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,451 (1984). At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the same jury
recommended by majority vote that he be sent to jail for life. Id. The trial judge, however,
disagreed with the jury and sentenced the petitioner to death. Id. at 451-52.
145. 1& at 462.
146. Id. at 461. For a well grounded argument that retribution is the sole purpose behind
the death penalty, see Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[i]n capital sentencing decisions .. , rehabilitation plays no role; incapacitation
is largely irrelevant, at least when the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole is available; and the assumption that death provides a greater deterrent than other
penalties is unsupported by persuasive evidence"). Therefore, Justice Stevens posits, the
principal justification for the death penalty is retribution. Id.; see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1980) (stating that "three of the reasons generally used
to justify imprisonment do not support capital punishment-rehabilitation is inapplicable,
incapacitation too conjectural... and deterrence, at the sentencing stage, an uninformed guess
and at odds with the need for individualization and the recognition of the finality of death").
Gillers argues that this leaves retribution as the exclusive motive for the imposition of the death
sentence. Id.
147. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461; see also Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 42 (summarizing
Spaziano's argument as follows: "Since the death penalty is society's expression of outrage at
especially offensive conduct, the jury, as representative of the community whose outrage is being
expressed, is more likely to reliably rank the offender and his offense on the yardstick of
community outrage.").
In addition, the petitioner in Spaziano contended that Florida's capital sentencing scheme
violated the Fifth Amendment's DoubleJeopardy Clause, the Sixth Amendment's ight to trial
by jury, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-58.
148. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467 (aflirmingjudgement of Supreme Court of Florida).
149. Id. at 461-62 (finding that deterrence and incapacitation also serve as justifications for
death penalty).
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capital cases. 1" To the Court, the community's voice and outrage
had already been afforded adequate consideration through the
representative process under which Florida's death penalty law was
enacted. Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that
Florida's override violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' Dismiss-
ing petitioner's claim that the Tedder standard led to arbitrary and
discriminatory imposition of death, the Court stated: "[We] already
ha[ve] recognized the significant safeguard the Tedder standard
affords a capital defendant in Florida. We are satisfied that the
Florida Supreme Court takes that standard seriously and has not
hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates ajury's role."5 2
150. Id. at 462 (noting that "[i]mposing the sentence in individual [death penalty] cases is
not the sole or even the primary vehicle through which the community's voice can be
expressed.... The community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when the
death penalty is authorized").
151. Id. at 466 (noting "[w]e see nothing that suggests that the application of the jury over-
ride procedure has resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty....").
152. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465 (citations omitted). In concluding its opinion, tie Court
stated that its duty was not "to second-guess the deference accorded the jury's recommendation
in a particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process [was] not arbitrary or
discriminatory." Id. But see Russell, supra note 1, at 14 (criticizing Court for making this
statement and interpreting it to denote that Court "appears to be more impressed with the fact
that a standard is in place than with the Tedder standard itself").
Justice Stevens, with Justices Brennan and Marshall, submitted a ringing dissent from the
majority's treatment of the jury override issue. Spaiano, 468 U.S. at 467-90 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The crux of the dissenters' argument is captured
in the following caption:
Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law asjudges
normally understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood only as an
expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral
entitlement to live-I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response can only
be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by ajury rather than
by a single governmental official. This conviction is consistent with the judgment of
history and the current consensus of opinion that juries are better equipped than
judges to make capital sentencing decisions ... the question whether a sentence of
death is excessive in the particular circumstances of any case is one that must be
answered by the decision maker that is best able to "express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life and death."
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)) (footnote omitted).
In addition, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's grant of deference to the Florida
legislature's revamped capital sentencing procedure. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 470-71 (StevensJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pointing out that Florida's override was enacted
during the confusing aftermath of Furman, a period in which no one knew what sort of death
penalty statute would pass constitutional scrutinyJustice Stevens stated that a "legislative choice
based on such a misunderstanding is not entitled to the same presumption ofvalidity as one that
rests wholly on a legislative assessment of sound policy.... ." Id. at 475 (Stevens,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
The statements made by Florida State Senator Ed Dunn, one of the drafters of the post-
Furman statute providing for judicial override, certainly substantiate Justice Stevens' concerns.
Senator Dunn described the Conference Committee that drafted the death penalty bill as
follows:
We went to Conference Committee and I can remember to this day that Conference
Committee going to about one-thirty or two o'clock in the morning. I remember
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C. Alabama's Death Penalty Statute
In Alabama, the defendant must commit one of eighteen statutorily
prescribed "death eligible" offenses15 before a punishment of death
can be imposed." Alabama's capital punishment statute155 com-
prises three phases: guilt, advisory verdict, and sentencing.
1 56
talking to some of the members of the Senate whom I respect today and did then, and
some of them are still in the Senate. And going out in the hall I remember one of
them asking me, do you really think it is better to go to judges [to impose capital
sentences] as opposed to thejury. No, we don't. We think we have to because Furman
requires it. What we sat down or really at that point stood there and worked out was
a compromise, a cross if you will, a hybrid between what was done in the Senate
version and the House version. And that cross was the utilization of the jury as a
recommending authority on the question of the ultimate sentence .... The question
to me from the [S]enator was, well how do we try to make ... the role of the jury
consistent with the tradition in this state? And frankly we found no way to do it. At
that time we were of the opinion that we had to have symmetry in the system, that we
had to have [a] consistent role of the judge and the jury, that we had to therefore
permit ajudge to overturn a recommended sentence of mercy by the jury.
Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 70 n.187.
Echoing Senator Dunn's sentiments, Professors Radelet and Mello stated:
Florida's statutory provision that ajudge may override ajury's life recommendation is
not based upon any legislative orjudicialjudgment that the life-to-death override serves
a crucial state interest. Rather, the provision is a product of the Legislature's
reasonable misunderstanding that such an override provision was required by the...
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.
Michael L Radelet & Michael Mello, Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida
Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 196, 197 (1992).
153. SeeALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1994). The statute lists those capital offenses for which death
is sanctioned as: (1) murder during "kidnaping in the first degree or an attempt thereof'; (2)
murder during "robbery in the first degree or an attempt thereof"; (3) murder during "rape in
the first or second degree or an attempt thereof," or "during sodomy in the first or second
degree or an attempt thereof'; (4) murder during "burglary in the first or second degree or an
attempt thereof'; (5) "[m]urder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper, federal law
enforcement officer, or any other state or federal peace officer... or prison jail guard" while
on duty or because of such guard or officer's official or job-related act; (6) murder while
"defendant is under sentence of life imprisonment"; (7) murder for pecuniary gain or "pursuant
to a contract for hire"; (8) murder "during sexual abuse in the first or second degree or an
attempt thereof'; (9) murder during "arson in the first or second degree," or by means of
explosives or explosion; (10) murder wherein "two or more persons" are killed; (11) murder
where the victim is a present or former state/federal public official because of that person's
"official position, act, or capacity"; (12) murder during unlawful assumption of "control of any
aircraft" by force or threat to obtain money for release of persons on board; (13) murder by one
who has been convicted of any other murder within the previous 20 years, subject to certain
requirements; (14) murder of victim who was to be witness in any court proceeding, (15)
murder of a victim under 14 years of age; (16) murder where the victim in a dwelling is killed
by a weapon fired from outside that dwelling; (17) murder where victim is killed in a vehicle by
weapon fired from outside the vehicle; and, (18) murder where the victim is killed from a
weapon fired from within a vehicle. I&
154. AIA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994).
155. ALA. CODE § 1SA-5-39 to -59 (1994).
156. See Russell, supra note 1, at 25 (summarizing Alabama's capital sentencing procedure
and characterizing statute as "tripartite").
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In the guilt phase, a jury of twelve determines the guilt or inno-
cence of the capital defendant.15 If the defendant is convicted, the
trial moves to the advisory verdict stage. 5 During this second
phase, the jury decides whether to sentence the convicted defendant
to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 9
The bulk of the hearing is devoted to offers of evidence by both the
prosecution and the defense as to the existence or nonexistence of
statutory aggravating, statutory mitigating, and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.16 To recommend death, the jury must find that at
least one aggravating factor exists."' Further, the jury must deter-
mine that the aggravating factor(s) found outweigh any mitigating
circumstances. 62 The jury can only recommend death if at least ten
of the twelve jurors vote for death." For life imprisonment,
however, a simple majority vote is required.' In the event that
157. AlA. R. CGuM. P. 18.1(a). To convict, there must be jury unanimity. Id § 23.1(a).
158. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994).
159. Id. § 13A-5-45(a). Much like Florida's second phase, Alabama's procedure consists of
"a due process hearing of the highest magnitude.'" Joseph A. Colquitt, The Death Penalty Laws
of Alabama, 33 AlA. L REV. 213, 282 (1982) (quoting Richardson v. State, 376 So. 2d 205, 224
(ALa Crim. App. 1978), aff'd, 376 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1979)).
160. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994). Alabama lists eight statutory aggravating circumstances:
(1) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (3) The defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons; (4) The capital offense was committed
while the defendant was engaged or was the accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery,
burglary, or kidnaping, (5) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (6) The
capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain; (7) The capital offense was
committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or
the enforcement of laws; or (8) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel compared to other capital offenses.
Kd § 13A-5-49.
Alabama's sentencing system also includes seven statutory mitigating circumstances:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) The capital
offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance; (3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct
or consented to it; (4) The defendant was an accomplice in a capital offense commit-
ted by another person and his participation was relatively minor;, (5) The defendant
acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; and (7)
The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id § 13A-5-51.
While limited to the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute, the sentencer may
consider additional nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that relate to the defendant's crime,
character, and background. Id. § 13A-5-52.
161. Md § 13A-5-46(e)(3).
162. Id.
163. ML § 13A-5-46(f).
164. Id.
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fewer than ten jurors choose death and fewer than seven seek life
imprisonment, the statute allows the judge to declare a mistrial.1"
In the sentencing hearing phase, the trial judge first hears both
sides' arguments as to the proper sentence'6 and then chooses the
death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, irrespective of the
jury's recommended sentence. 67 The trial court is instructed:
In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine
whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the
mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in doing so the trial
court shall consider the recommendation of the jury contained in
its advisory verdict, unless such a verdict has been waived... [w]hile
the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given
consideration, it is not binding upon the court."
Alabama trial judges are required to provide written findings in all
capital cases.1 69 These findings must be predicated on all aspects of
the trial, from evidence presented in the .guilt phase, to the pre-
sentence report.1 0 In addition, judges must make findings relating
to the existence or nonexistence of both statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as nonstatutory mitigating factors."' If the
punishment is death,judges must note that the aggravating factor(s)
found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 7 2 All death
sentences receive automatic appellate review.7 This review entails
a proportionality test and an independent reweighing of the aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances.
174
D. Case Law Interpreting Alabama's Capital Sentencing Statute
Unlike Florida, Alabama courts have not developed a standard to
guide trial judges' determinations of whether to upsetjuries' advisory
165. Id § 13A-5-46(g).
166. Id. § 13A-5-47(c).
167. Id. § 13A-5-47(e) (stating that jury's recommended sentence must be considered but
is not binding on court).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. § 13A-547(d).
170. Id Thejudge must also consider the pre-sentence investigation report that is furnished
by the prosecution. Id. § 13A-5-47(b). It includes facts about the defendant's mental health and
upbringing, which provide the court with a more detailed description of the person whose life
is at stake. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 330-31. Once the report is lodged with the court, it must
be made available to the defense. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 330-31.
171. AlA. CODE §13A-5-47(d).
172. Id. § 13A-5-47(e).
173. Id. § 13A-5-53.
174. See id. (requiring review for influence of passion or prejudice on sentencing and to
determine if death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to penalty imposed in similar cases).
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verdicts."7 As the Supreme Court of Alabama noted in Ex parte
jones.1
76
It appears to this Court... that the United States Supreme Court
... [has] not f[ound] the Tedder rule to be a general constitutional
requirement under a statutory scheme similar to that of Florida.
Instead ... the Court merely approved the standard which the
Florida courts have adopted providing for additional protection to
the defendant. ... Therefore, [Alabama is] not required by the
United States Constitution to adopt the Tedder rule.
77
As Ex parte Jones reveals, Alabama trial judges possess the complete
power to override jury recommendations subject to the terms of the
capital sentencing statute. Unlike Florida, there is no judicially
created standard that constrains a trial judge's ability to disregard the
advice of the jury. It is against this backdrop that Louise Harris
challenged the Supreme Court to strike down Alabama's death
penalty statute.
III. HARmtS . ALABAMA 78
Louise Harris, an African-American mother of seven, was convicted
of capital murder by a jury of her peers.17' The jury found that she
arranged for her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to kill her husband, Isaiah
Harris, so that she and McCarter could share the proceeds of Mr.
Harris' retirement benefits and life insurance."8 McCarter consum-
mated the killing by ambushing Mr. Harris and shooting him once in
the head.' McCarter struck a deal with the State and agreed to
testify against Ms. Harris in exchange for leniency.'82
Prior to delivering its penalty recommendation, the jury learned
that Ms. Harris had no prior criminal record, was a responsible
175. See Russell, supra note 1, at 26-27 (noting that of four override states Alabama is "sole
jurisdiction without an override standard"). The Supreme Courts of Indiana and Delaware have
created a standard similar to Florida's Tedder standard. See, e.g., Martinez Chavez v. State, 534
N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989) (holding that "in order to sentence a defendant to death after the
jury has recommended against death, the factsjustifIing a death sentence should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that death was appropriate in light
of the offender and his crime"); Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992) (same); see also
Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes
that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 312 (1989)
(characterizing Indiana override standard as "functional equivalent" of Tedder standard).
176. 456 So. 2d 380 (Ala. 1984), cert. denie, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985).
177. ExparteJones, 456 So. 2d 380, 381-82 (Ala. 1984), cert. denie., 470 U.S. 1062 (1985).
178. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
179. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.4, Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995) (No. 93-7659)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
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parent, worked three jobs to support her children, and was an avid
churchgoer.'" The trial judge instructed the jury that upon weigh-
ing the aggravating and mitigating factors, it was to recommend a
sentence of either life imprisonment without possibility of parole or
death."8 The jury, by a seven to five count,'" rejected the death
penalty and recommended that Ms. Harris be sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for her role in orchestrat-
ing the killing of her husband.
1 86
The trial judge disagreed with the jury's recommendation.
187
Although he linked only one aggravating circumstance to the
offense,"8 and found several mitigating factors to exist,18 9 the trial
judge nevertheless overrode the jury and sentenced Ms. Harris to
death."9 In his sentencing order, the trial judge made only cursory
mention of the jury's recommended verdict without explaining why
he disregarded it.' It is impossible to ascertain why the judge
rejected the jury's advice or what role, if any, the jury's recommenda-
tion played in influencing the judge's penalty decision.
On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the
Alabama Supreme Court both dismissed Ms. Harris' assertions that
Alabama's standardlessjury override was unconstitutional and that the
judge's use of the override in her case was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 92 This was no surprise. No Alabama appellate court has ever
reversed a trial judge's use of the override to impose death.93 The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
183. 1I at 3.
184. Hanis, 115 S. Ct. at 1033.
185. ML
186. 1& The trial court, however, in overriding the jury, placed substantial weight on the
money that Ms. Harris stood to gain from the proceeds of her husband's life insurance policy.
187. Id.
188. Id. The trial judge found that Ms. Harris had her husband killed for pecuniary gain,
one of the eight aggravating circumstances listed in statute. Ad; see ALA. CODE §13A-5-49(6)
(1994) (providing that "capital offense ... committed for pecuniary gain" is considered
aggravating circumstance).
189. Hanis, 115 S. Ct. at 1033. The trial judge found one statutory mitigating factor existed-
Ms. Harris had no prior criminal record. IA The judge also found three nonstatutory
mitigating factors-Harris was: (1) hardworking; (2) a respected member of the church; and
(3) well regarded in the community. Id.
190. IX
191. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 4.
192. Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993); Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Ct.
Crim. App. 1992).
193. See id. at 29-30 (noting that Alabama courts have never reversed death override and
stating that sometimes these death overrides are affirmed without any reference to jury's life
recommendation).
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Alabama's standardless override scheme violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.'9
The crux of petitioner's argument to the Supreme Court was that
Alabama's complete failure to provide guidelines as to the role that
thejury's recommendation should play in thejudge's ultimate penalty
decision allowed for arbitrary treatment of the jury's advice.
95
Petitioner argued that this failure to regulate the sentencing
relationship between the judge and jury introduced arbitrariness into
the process of administering death. 9  Armed with complete
discretion to treat the jury's advice in any manner they desire, trial
judges randomly and capriciously override jury life recommenda-
tions.197 Certainly such arbitrariness ran contrary to Furman's
concern that a validly administered death penalty enabled one to
distinguish "the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."19 In addition, petitioner pressed the
argument that Florida's Tedderstandard, under which trial judges were
required to ascribe great weight to the jury's recommended verdict,
was constitutionally required." Petitioner argued that the only way
to rid the override of its arbitrary element was to define clearly the
role of the jury's recommendation in the sentencing process."'
In an eight to one vote, the Supreme Court upheld Alabama's
standardless jury override scheme.20 ' The Court ruled that the
heart of the Eighth Amendment analysis was not what sort of weight
a state chooses to attach to the jury's recommendation, but whether
the statute sufficiently limited the sentencer's discretion in order to
minimize arbitrary outcomes. °2 Noting that Alabama successfully
guided the sentencing decision by requiring the jury and judge to
weigh independently aggravating and mitigating factors,03 the Court
warned that it would be acting as legislators rather than judges if they
194. See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1032 ("We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's argument
that Alabama's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify the
weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation and thus permits arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty.").
195. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 7.
196. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 7.
197. SeePetitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 7 (asserting that Alabamajury recommendations
are treated in wholly inconsistent manner by trial judges).
198. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (WhiteJ, concurring).
199. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (1995).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1037 (ruling that Constitution is not offended when sentencingjudge is required
to consider jury recommendation without having to treat it with specific degree of weight).
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. Id.
202. Id. at 1035.
203. Id.
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demanded that Alabama place a specific degree of weight on the
jury's advisory verdict."'
The Court also rejected petitioner's claim that the Tedder standard
was constitutionally required for capital sentencing schemes that
included judicial override provisions." 5 The Court's approval of the
Tedder standard"6 did not militate a conclusion that the Tedder
standard -as a constitutional requirement.0 7  Moreover, citing to
a principle enunciated in Franklin v. Lynaugh, °0 and followed in
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 9 the Court observed that there was no
constitutional requirement that a state place any specific weight on
particular aggravating or mitigating factors to be considered by the
sentencer.2 10 By analogy, the Court concluded that requiring that a
certain weight be ascribed to Alabama jury recommendations would
"offend this established principle.""
The ruling in Harris represents a huge departure from twenty years
of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court's prior demand that
death be imposed in the manner that most reliably prevents arbitrary
results was trampled by the Harris decision. Harris endorsed the view
that one person should have the unbridled power to impose death
over the collective judgment of twelve. This arrangement is problem-
atic for two reasons. First, it tends to dilute the community's voice as
represented by the collegial body-the jury. Second, it gives judges
the unchecked power to impose death.
204. Id. at 1036 (invoking principle of federalism and arguing that requiring certain degree
of weight be attached tojury recommendation would "place within constitutional ambit micro-
management tasks that properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its criminal
justice system").
205. Id. at 1035.
206. The Tedderstandard obligates Florida trial judges to pay substantial deference tojury
recommendations in capital sentencing cases. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1976);
see supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text (discussing in detail Tedder decision).
207. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
208. 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (dismissing petitioner's argument that his death sentence was
tainted by jury's failure to accord proper weight to mitigating circumstances and holding that
specific method for "balancing mitigating and aggravating factors.., is [not] constitutionally
required").
209. 494 U.S. 299,306-07 (1990) (rejecting condemned petitioner's argument that state must
prescribe weight to individual aggravating circumstances on ground that once aggravating
circumstances have been found to exist, "the Eighth Amendment does not require that those
aggravating circumstances be further refined ... by ajury").
210. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
211. Id. at 1036.
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IV. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND OVERRIDE LAWS
A. The Deficiencies in Florida's Death Penalty Statute:
Florida's Statute in Practice
Florida's capital sentencing procedure, like Alabama's, is riddled
with practical problems. First, it is extremely inefficient."' Data
indicates that between two-thirds to three-fourths of all Florida life-to-
death overrides have been reversed or remanded on appeal.3 Dr.
Michael Radelet, an authority on Florida's override practices, revealed
that in the fifteen years since the decision in Furman, life-to-death
overrides have been reversed in seventy-four percent of the cases.214
Another commentator concluded that "[o]ver the past half decade
•.. overrides have been reversed in more than ninety-three percent
of the relevant cases [and] ... overrides of life recommendations
have survived appellate review in less than seven percent of the
cases."' Such statistics led Florida Governor Lawton Chiles to
conclude that "I think we'd be better ... if we did away with the
override."2"6 Addressing the override's inefficiency, a Florida court
of appeals judge wrote, "[Ilt makes no sense to continue to allow the
judge to override the jury's recommendation of life ... when such
cases result in reversal eighty to ninety percent of the time.... As a
practical matter, most such defendants end up with a life [imprison-
ment] sentence."
2 1 7
212. Mello, supra note 1, at 936.
213. Mello, supra note 175, at 290.
214. Mello, supra note 1, at 93'7 (citing letter written by Professor Radelet that contained
chart detailing final result, on appeal, of all life-to-death override cases in Florida).
215. Mello, supra note 1, at 938 (emphasis omitted).
216. Ellen McGarrahan, State Ponders ChangingSteps to Execution, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 1991,
at 6B. Ironically, Governor Chiles' supposed dissatisfaction with the override did not prevent
him from signing a death warrant for Robert Francis, who was sentenced to death despite the
jury's recommendation for mercy in his case. Id.
217. Gerald B. Cope,Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Courts:
A Comparison of Florida's System with Those of OtherStates and the Federal System 45 FLA. L. REV. 21,
100 (1993). In his article, Mr. Cope, a former Florida appellate judge, suggests that eliminating
trial judges' life-to-death override power would decrease the Florida Supreme Court's death
penalty docket by 21%. Id. at 101. This is because the district courts of appeal, not the supreme
court, hear all life sentence appeals. Id. at 100. If the judge could use only the override to
impose life over a recommendation of death, all override appeals would deal with the propriety
of the life sentence, and be handled by the district courts of appeal. Id. In sum, if death
overrides were eliminated, the Florida Supreme Court's overall workload would be reduced by
approximately six to eight percent. Id. at 101. For a detailed analysis on the inefficiency of this
procedure, see generally Radelet, supra note 4, at 1422-24 (analyzing cost ofoverride to defendants
and criminal justice system). Professor Radelet states:
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The second inadequacy With Florida's jury override provision is that
it derogates the jury's primary role in determining the appropriate-
ness of a death sentence.21 '  The Tedder standard demands that
before overriding ajury's verdict, the judge must determine that no
reasonable person could have sentenced the capital defendant to life
imprisonment instead of death.1 9 Thus, when a trial judge over-
rides a jury's life-sentence recommendation, he or she is, in effect,
declaring that the jury is comprised of unreasonable people.221 This
process has a tendency to make jurors feel that they are meaningless
From the state's perspective, one must question whether the number of hours invested
in cases with ajury recommendation of life are justifiable given that so few of the cases
will result in execution. Had the financial costs of unwarranted override cases been
foreseen by the 1972 Legislature, it is difficult to believe that the override provision
would have been included in the statute.
Id. at 1424.
218. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
prosecutorial statements that had the effect of lessening the jury's sense of responsibility for
imposition of the death penalty ran afoul of the Court's position that because death is
qualitatively different from any other punishment, a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny
and reliability of the capital sentencing procedure is required. Id. at 340-41.
In Ca~dwe! the prosecutor told the jury that the true arbiter of the capital defendant's
punishment was the appellate court. Id. at 333. Agreeing that such a comment may well have
diminished thejury's sense of responsibility for its actionsJustice Marshall concluded that these
jurors had been tempted to believe that the appellate court had more of a right to decide
whether the defendant's life should be spared than thejury. Id Such an invitation to rely on
judicial review "generat[ed] a bias toward returning a death sentence that [was] simply too
great." Id.
Applying the holding of Caldwell to the override statutes, Professor Michael Mello contends
that when the jury learns that its verdict is only advisory, it is "left, at best, with the sense that
its sentencing decision will not necessarily be followed... [and] [a]t worst, it may believe that
its determination is only pro farina, of little relevance to the defendant's fate." Mello, supra note
175, at 303. Much like the jury in Caldwe14 the override jury is infected with a diminished sense
of responsibility that leads to the same death bias that the Court in Caldwell struck down as
unconstitutional. Id.
219. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1976).
220. See Colquitt, supra note 159, at 327 ("Strict adherence to the Tedder standard would
prohibit a trial judge from ever disagreeing with a sentence recommended by the jury."); accord
Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 62 (suggesting that differences between reasonable people
deciding death penalty cases are unavoidable); Russell, supra note 1, at 16-17 (noting that Tedder
does little to help judges determine whether jury acted reasonably). Professors Mello and
Robson bolster this statement by revealing that in 17 of 24 cases in which the Florida Supreme
Court has affirmed death overrides, there was a dissent registered from at least one Florida
Supreme CourtJustice. Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 62. Thus, according to Tedde's
reasonable person standard, these Florida Supreme Court Justices must not be reasonable
people. Id, at 64. If true, this notion renders the Tedderstandard inoperable because "unless
one is willing to conclude that majorities of variousjuries, numerous circuit courtjudges, and
all the justices of the Florida Supreme Court are [unreasonable] ... their differing conclusions
militate against any reasonable person accepting the validity of the Tedder standard." Id. In
addition, Professors Mello and Robson state that the decision to grant mercy is a subjective one,
not based on a "'wholly rational, calculated, and logical process.'" Id at 61 (quoting Washington
v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982)).
Therefore, if sentencers must choose the punishment of life over death by following their
instincts, such choices are simply not amenable to the reasonable person language of Tedder.
Id.
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components of the trial.22" ' As one Florida capital juror complained,
"If [the trial judge] wasn't going to follow our sentencing verdict, why
did he ask us for our opinion in the first place?"222
B. The Deficiencies of Alabama's Death Penalty Law: Alabama's Statute
in Practice
Alabama's failure to create a standard that specifically defines
situations in which the override should be invoked leads to arbitrary
results."z Moreover, this deficiency has created a situation in which
the conscience of the community-the jury-has been all but
removed from Alabama's capital sentencing process.2 4 As previous-
221. See Radelet, supra note 4, at 1425 (suggesting that override using Tedderstandard "insults
thosejurors who have tried to do theirjobs as conscientiously as possible, but who then see their
collective judgments ignored"). Dr. Radelet believes that some jurors are compelled to acquit
in the guilt phase because they fear that if they convict and recommend life, the trial judge will
impose death anyway. Id. at n.40. Thus, even though the juror may feel that the defendant is
guilty and should spend his life in jail, he votes to acquit to circumvent the power ofjudicial
override. Id. at 1427 n.46 (citing Letter from Professor Ernest van den Haag to Dr. Michael L.
Radelet (Apr. 22, 1985) (on file with U.C. Davis Law Review)).
222. Mello, supra note 1, at 927 (quoting from memory).
223. See infra notes 243-67 and accompanying text (illustrating how absence of override
standard leads to confusion among Alabama judges as to weight they should accord to jury
recommendation); see also Russell, supra note 1, at 39 (contending that Court erred in Harris
because Alabama scheme leads to disproportionate sentences in like cases). Professor Russell
also argues that such variance cuts against rationale of Funnan wherein Justice Douglas stated,
"'The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would render unconstitutibnal
capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow the maximum possible
variation from one case to the next, and provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously
maximized variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice.'" (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n.11 (1972) (DouglasJ., concurring)).
224. It is widely accepted that the jury is more representative of the community in which it
sits than the judge. Gillers, supra note 146, at 63. Professor Giller commented:
Intuitively,juries chosen in accordance with rules calculated to assure that they reflect
a "fair cross section of the community" are more likely to accurately express community
values than are state trial judges. This is true because twelve people are more likely
than one person to reflect public sentiment, because jurors are selected in a manner
enhancing that likelihood, and because trial judges collectively do not represent-by
race, sex, or economic or social class-the communities from which they come. The
response of a representative jury of acceptable size is consequently taken to be the
community response. The jury does not try to determine what the community would
say but, in giving its conclusion, speaks for the community. The judge, on the other
hand, must either assess the community's "belief" or "conscience" and impose it or
must impose his own and assume it is the community's. Whichever thejudge does, the
representative jury would seem to have a substantially better chance of identifying the
community view simply by speaking its mind. [This notion is borne out) in cases
treating jury composition at culpability trials. In this related area, the Court has
stressed the importance of a representative jury as an aid in assuring "meaningful
community participation," and has accepted the idea that different segments of the
community will bring to the representative jury "perspective and values that influence
both jury deliberation and result." In addition, the Court has said that juries of
decreasing size have a reduced chance of reflecting minority viewpoints. The Court's
conclusions that the size and representativeness of juries influence their ability to
reflect community values support an inference that a representative jury of adequate
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ly demonstrated, the most legitimate rationale for the death penalty
is retribution." Because retribution is society's device against those
deviants who are deemed morally undeserving of life, capital
punishment must be doled out by society. A representative cross
section of the community should, therefore, bear the responsibility to
"express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question
of life or death." 226 Consequently, Alabama's scheme, whereby the
judge may single-handedly impose death over the jury's verdict, runs
contrary to the tenets of the Court's Eighth Amendment teachings
that the sanction of death should represent the community's choice
that a person has "lost [his] right to have rights."227
Justice Stevens echoed these sentiments in his Harris dissent.
22
Emphasizing the prevailing view that juries are better equipped to
make capital sentencing determinations, he argued that:
the men and women of the jury may be regarded as a microcosm
of the community, who will reflect the changing attitudes of society
as a whole to the infliction of capital punishment, and that there
could therefore be no more appropriate body to decide whether
the fellow-citizen whom they have found guilty of murder should
*.. [die] or receive a lesser punishment.
22
Similarly, because the sentencing decision is unavoidably moral and
emotional in nature, both judges and juries will interject personal
views into their penalty decisions.80 Much like jurors, judges are
size is also more likely than a single judge to reflect the community's retributive
sentiment. Indeed, since capital sentencing involves application of community values,
whereas guilt determination predominantly demands fact-finding, the Court's
conclusions would seem to apply with even greater force in the capital sentencing area.
Gillers, supra note 146, at 63-65 (citations omitted).
Professor Russell revealed that in Alabama, 99% of all trial judges are white males earning
approximately $72,000 per year. Russell, supra note 1, at 44 n.253. In comparison, the citizens
of Alabama are 48% male, 52% female. Id. Seventy-five percent of the Alabama population is
black and the average yearly income is $13,700. Id. It is plain to see that these Aabamajudges
are not representative of the communities in which they sit. Id. at 45. Accord Mello & Robson,
supra note 107, at 47-48 (contrasting composite sketch of average Florida circuit judge with
attributes of Florida population and concluding that wide chasm existed between two groups).
225. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (postulating that retribution is sole penal
purpose of death penalty).
226. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
227. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (holding that penalty of expatriation is
functional equivalent of saying that defendant has lost right to have rights).
228. SeeHarris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (1995) (StevensJ., dissenting) (criticizing
unbridled discretion ofjudges to override jury determination in death penalty cases).
229. Id, at 1038 (quoting Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, Report 200
(1953)).
230. SeeVivian Berger, Black Box Decisions on Life orDeath-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the
Jury: A Reply toJudge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (1991) (arguing
that personal considerations are undoubtedly involved in capital sentencing).
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apt to possess their own prejudices toward certain discrete groups.2"'
In addition, upcoming elections may motivate some judges to "skew
their verdicts against leniency" in an attempt to portray themselves as
"tough on crime."" 2 These personal biases and political motivations
are better tempered within a deliberative collegial body of twelve than
by a single government official. 3 3 It is the jury that serves the
important function as a safeguard between the government (the
biased judge) and the capital defendant.2" As Justice Stevens
commented, when a trial judge imposes death over the jury's
recommendation of life the "critical 'link between contemporary
community values and the penal system'" is severed.3 5 Further,
overrides tend to erode the legitimacy of jury verdicts.236 While the
public presumes that a death sentence imposed by the jury embodies
the community's view that death is appropriate in light of the
defendant and his crime, this same presumption of validity does not
exist when a lone government official orders death.3"
Unlike judges,juries are free from the cynicism thatjudges acquire
due to the passage of countless convicts before their eyes.2" Judges,
because of their extensive exposure to criminals, may become jaded
and callous toward all capital defendants.23 9 Rather than honing in
on the particular capital defendant and the facts attendant to his case,
judges may lump the defendant together with "a global category of
faceless criminals who, in the abstract, may appear unworthy of
life."2' The jury's fresh perspective enables it to focus "on a
particular case involving the fate of one fellow citizen."24 By
231. See i&t (discussing Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals nominee because of her demonstrated racial prejudices).
232. See id. at 1085 n.107 (suggesting that where judges are elected they impose death more
frequently on defendants whose trials take place in election years); see also Steven B. Bright, The
Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime," but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST.
Louis U. UJ. 479, 483-85 (1995) (referring to "soft on crime" rhetoric as admonition to make
prison life harsher and inflict death penalty more often).
233. SeeHarris, 115 S. Ct. at 1039 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (concluding that jury sentencing
in capital cases is more legitimate because jury is composed of twelve people who check and
balance each other's views).
234. See Berger, supra note 230, at 1067 (referring to judge Higginbotham's characterization
ofjury as "global buffer" between defendant and government official).
235. Hanis, 115 S. Ct. at 1040 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
236. Id. at 1042.
237. Id. at 1041. Discussing several studies regarding the effect that executions have on the
public, Justice Stevens opined that government-sanctioned executions not predicated on the
judgment of a representativejury "may undermine respect for the value of human life itself and
unwittingly increase tolerance of killing." Id.
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upholding Alabama judges' practice of ignoring jury recommenda-
tions in capital cases, the Supreme Court in Harris broke from the
teachings of Furman and its progeny."
Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is also problematic because
the courts of Alabama, unlike those of Florida, have not articulated
a standard to guide the trial judge in determining when to override
the jury's recommended verdict.2' The trial judge is free to
disregard the jury's advice if he simply disagrees with it."4  This
failure to regulate the relationship betweenjudge and jury has created
a sentencing process which invites arbitrary imposition of capital
punishment.2  Adherence to standardless overrides has trans-
formed meaningful appellate review into a charade in which cursory
affirmances of trial judges' decisions to disregard life recommenda-
tions are the norm.2' Alabama appellate courts amplify this lack of
242. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing Furman and its teachings
related to imposition of death penalty).
243. See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1032 (discussing fact that Alabama's capital sentencing provision
does not prescribe weight or deference judge must use in assessing jury's recommendation in
capital case).
244. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 23. Although the statute gives trial judges the
discretion to use the override to impose life over a death recommendation, 95% of Alabama
overrides consist of the judicial imposition of death over jury life recommendations (47 death,
5 life overrides). Id. at 23 n.26.
Such lopsided use of the override does not comport with Justice Stevens' belief that "the
legislative decision to authorize an override was intended to protect the defendant from the risk
of an erroneous jury decision ... to impose death." Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1040 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
245. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182 ("Because Alabama trialjudges use haphazard and
capricious procedures in assessing and rejecting jury life recommendations, it is impossible to
distinguish ... between those who receive death and those who do not.").
246. The absence of meaningful review is exemplified in the appeals of Ms. Harris' death
sentence. Both appellate courts made only casual reference to the fact that Ms. Harris' jury
recommended that her life be spared. Ex paite Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993); Harris v.
Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995), affg sub nom. Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993), af/'g
sub nom. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Moreover, neither court
examined the trialjudge's treatment of the jury's recommendation. SeeExparteHarris, 632 So.
2d 543 (Ala. 1993); Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
In many cases, condemned petitioners argue that because Alabama lacks an override standard,
the capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Frasier v. State, 562 So. 2d 543 (Ala.
Crim. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 562 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, Frazier v. State, No.
CR-89-1334, 1994 Ala. LEXIS 263 (Feb. 25, 1994); Tarver v. State, 553 So. 2d 631 (Ala. Crim.
App.), aff'd, 553 So. 2d 633 (Ala. 1989), cert. deniAe, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Crowe v. State, 485
So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 485 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1985), cert. denie,
477 U.S. 909 (1986).
In ExparteJones, 456 So. 2d 380 (Ala. 1984), the Alabama Supreme Court once again refused
to adopt a Tedder-like standard. Id. at 382. The court held that they "[were] not required by
the United States Constitution to adopt the Tedder rule." Id. The court concluded by telling
the Petitioner to address his concerns to the state legislature. I. at 383, died in Russell, supra
note 1, at 36-37.
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meaningful review. No Alabama trial judge's decision to override the
jury's life recommendation has ever been reversed."'
This complete lack of guidance as to when to use the override has
led Alabama trial judges to confront the jury's advisory verdict in
several confusing ways and to accord it divergent degrees of defer-
ence. Professor Katheryn Russell's research on this subject is
instructive. Professor Russell analyzed Alabama's standardless jury
override by obtaining sentencing orders for eighty-one percent of the
cases in which Alabama trial judges overrode jury life recommenda-
tions."4 She sought to determine how these judges treated jury
recommendations in capital cases.249 Professor Russell found that
the jury's recommended sentence was treated differently from judge
to judge 5 0 In fact, in some instances the same judge has accorded
the advisory verdict different treatment from case to case.'5 Some
judges treated the jury recommendation as a mitigating factor."2
Some viewed the jury's advice as an "aspect" of mitigation that must
be weighed as something less than one of the statutorily provided
mitigating circumstances. 53  Others did not factor it into the
aggravation-mitigation equation at all.' Last, Professor Russell's
247. SeePetitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 8 ("The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and
the Alabama Supreme Court have failed to scrutinize death sentences following jury life
recommendations and have never reversed a sentence of death due to improper judicial
override.") (emphasis added); see alsoRussell, supranote 1, at 88-39 (discussing how standardless
overrides prevent meaningful appellate review because appellate courts do not know reasons why
trial judge overrode jury life recommendation).
248. Professor Russell concluded that the procedure in which the override is employed is
haphazard and random. Russell, supra note 1, at 31-35. In conclusion, she stated:
"Guided discretion" is not met by a scheme which permits one judge to employ the
override only where aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones "to a moral
certainty," anotherjudge who need only find a "reasonable basis" for the override, and
still another who does not enunciate any standard for overriding the jury verdict.
Id. at 35.
249. Russell, supra note 1, at 28-35.
250. Russell, supra note 1, at 42-43.
251. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 24 (describing inconsistent practices of
individual judges in capital sentencing). For example, Randall Thomas, Ms. Harris' trialjudge,
merely stated that he "considered" the jury's life recommendation in his order sentencing Ms.
Harris to death. Id. This was the extent to which the jury's advice was discussed in Judge
Thomas' sentencing order. In the case of State v. Coral, No. CC-88-741-THE (Cir, Ct.
Montgomery County, Ala. June 26, 1992), dted in Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 24-25,
however, Judge Thomas treated the jury's life recommendation as a mitigating factor and
accorded it "great weight," despite his disagreement with it. ExactywhyJudge Thomas classified
the jury's advice as mitigating in one case but not in the other will never be known. See
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 25 (finding no "discernible distinguishing principle" that
led judge to give weight to verdict in some cases but not in Ms. Harris').
252. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 22-23 (listing Alabama cases in which judge
treated jury life recommendation as mitigating factor).
253. SeePetitioner's Bhef, supra note 182, at 23 n.28 (listing cases in which trial court treated
advisory verdict "not as a full mitigating circumstance under the law").
254. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 24.
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research revealed that some judges treated the jury's advice in a
distinct manner, separate from the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors. 5
To make matters worse, Alabama trial judges accord varying degrees
of weight to the jury's recommendation. 6 Although the statute
only requires that they consider the jury's recommendation, some
judges have factored it into their sentencing decision.' Others
stated that they afforded it substantial consideration or great
deference. 8 Some imposed death without even mentioning that
they considered it, 9 and some appear to have ignored it in practice
and merely recited it in their sentencing orders.2"
The case of State v. Mury 61 illustrates the arbitrariness that
dominates Alabama's capital sentencing process. In Mury, the trial
judge overrode the jury's recommendation in the first trial, and after
the case was reversed on appeal, he accepted it in the second
trial.262 In the initial trial to determine guilt or innocence, the
judge began by classifying the jury's recommendation as ajudgment
deserving great weight.2  In the judge's penalty phase ruling,
however, he switched positions and concluded that the jury's
recommendation was only a mitigating factor.Y The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.26
255. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 23 nn.24 & 28 (citing Sentencing Order, State
v.Johnson, No. C,-84-0331 (Cir. Ct. Morgan County, Ala. Nov. 8, 1985)). In Johnson, the trial
judge categorized the jury's recommendation as an "aspect of mitigation separate and apart and
in addition to" the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id.; see also Russell,
supra note 1, at 30 n.188 (discussing this feature of Johnson case).
256. See Russell, supra note 1. at 32 ("[C]ompounding the Alabama override fog, is how the
jury's advisory verdict is weighed. Here again, no manifest rule is discernible from the cases.
In fact [an Alabama court] ha[s] expressly noted that there is 'no Alabama law that specifies the
weight a trial court is to accord ajury's advisory sentence.'" (quoting Sockwell v. State, No. CR-
89-225, 1993 WL 537450, at *23 (Ala Grim. App. Dec. 30, 1993))).
257. See Russell, supra note 1, at 33 & n.199 (noting cases in which judges "considered the
advisory verdict as one of many factors in the sentencing tally").
258. See Russell, supra note 1, at 33 & n.200 (listing cases where judges accorded advisory
verdict greater weight).
259. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 26 (citing Sentencing Order, State v. Turner,
C0-83-340-SW (Cir. Ct. Etowah County, Ala. 1983) for proposition that Alabama trial judges
impose death sentence without even noting jury's recommendation of life sentence).
Ordinarily, however, the sentencing order will make "express reference" to the jury's sentencing
verdict. Russell, supra note 1, at 32.
260. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 26 (discussing Sentencing Order, State v.
Lindsay, No. CC-82-212 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Sept. 8, 1982) in which court stated, in
perfunctory manner, that it was "judicially aware" ofjury's advisory verdict).
261. No. CC-82-211G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala.June 18, 1982), dted in Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 182, at 27-28.
262. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 27 (describing disposition of Murny case).
263. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 27 (detailing first decision by trial judge).
264. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 27-28.
265. Murry v. State, 455 So. 2d 82, 82 (Ala. Grim. App. 1984).
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In this second hearing, the samejudge assigned a different weight to
the jury's recommendation and proclaimed that he was unaware of
any reported decision suggesting how much weight should be
accorded a jury's advisory verdict.2" This judge's treatment of the
override illustrates the inherent unfairness which taints the override
procedure. The Alabama capital sentencing scheme appears to be a
"lottery" in which a capital defendant's fate is in the hands of an
inconsistent judge with the absolute discretion to impose life or
death.267
V. How PoLmcs FACTORS INTO THE OVERRIDE EQUATION
Compounding the above articulated deficiencies in the Alabama
and Florida statutes is the pressure exerted on elected judges by the
political arena. Judges are far less likely to make unpopular rulings
if they must run for re-election.2" In Alabama, trial judges face
partisan elections every six years.269 The same is true for Florida
trial judges.27 ° Given such political pressures, it should come as no
surprise that judges impose death far more frequently than juries.27 1
Justice Stevens highlighted the fear that politics plays a role in capital
sentencing decisions. He warned:
[T]he Framers of our Constitution "knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect... against judges too
responsive to the voice of higher authority." The "higher authority"
to whom present-day capital judges may be "too responsive" is a
political climate in which judges who covet higher office-or who
merely wish to remain judges--must constantly profess their fealty
to the death penalty.
2
266. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 182, at 27-28 (citing Sentencing Order, State v. Murry, No.
CC-82-211G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. June 18, 1989)). For a summary of both the
procedural history and the facts of the Muny case, see Murry v. State, 562 So. 2d 1348, 1349-52
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
267. See Furman v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (characterizing pre-Furman death
penalty statute as lottery because under statute capital defendants were arbitrarily selected for
death).
268. SeeThomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect ofJudidal Elections onJudges'Abilty
to Protect CiminalDefendants'Rights, 7 LAw & INEQ.J. 107, 108 (1988) (citingA.BA COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, REPORTTO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243,293 (1986),
which concluded that state judges are constrained to follow wishes of electorate).
269. ALA. CONST. amend. 328 § 615.
270. FLA. CoNsT. art. 5 §10(b).
271. See HARRY KALVIN, JR. & HANS ZEiSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 436 (1971) (noting that
judges impose death penalty "somewhat more often" than juries); Paul Mancino, III, Note,Juiy
Waiver in Capital Cases; An Assessment of the Voluntay, Knouing and Intelligent Standard, 39 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 605, 613 (1991) (insisting thatjudges are more likely to impose death penalty than
juries).
272. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (citations omitted)).
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Justice Stevens concluded that the "danger that [judges] will bend to
political pressures" when making capital sentencing determinations in
high profile cases "is the same danger confronted byjudges beholden
to King George III. "27 Just like any other popularly elected official,
judges are fair game for political criticism. 4 The fear is that judges
may use the override to impose death in order to escape attacks from
political opponents and the media who prey eagerly on judges who
are perceived to be soft on the death penalty. 75 Ifjudges capitulate
to these attacks, then they are making capital sentencing decisions
tainted by passion and prejudice.276 With no meaningful check on
judges' decisions to overridejury life recommendations, the reliability
in sentencing procedures stressed in Furman is eviscerated. The
process reverts to the arbitrary and capricious stage that Furman
denounced.
A good example of the public pressure that judges face is the case
of the Alday murders. 77 Four convicts escaped a Maryland prison
and drove to Donaldsonville, Georgia.27 Once there, two of the
men entered the Alday's home and proceeded to pillage it.279 Soon
after the robbery began, members of the Alday family began to arrive
home.2" As the family returned to their home, the fugitives fatally
shot all six of them.
281
273. Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
274. Today's political climate is evidenced by the numerous political attacks on senators,
governors, andjudges who are thought to be soft on crime and capital punishment. SeeHarris,
115 S. Ct. at 1039 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting instances in which officials from all
walks of public office have been subjected to election campaigns directed toward portraying
them as soft on capital punishment).
275. SeeSteven B. Bright & Patrickj. Keenan,Judges and the Politits of Death: DecidingBetween
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 765 (1995) (arguing
that judge deciding capital cases may "sign his own political death warrant" by going against
popular opinion).
276. See Han-is, 115 S. Ct. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that significant political
pressures exerted on judges help explain why they are "far more likely" than juries to impose
death sentence).
277. See Ross, supra note 268, at 113 & n.44 (citing Dungee v. State, 227 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.),
cert. deniAe, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); Issacs v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (per curiam) (Ga.), cert. denieA
429 U.S. 986 (1976); Coleman v. State, 226 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 909
(1977)).
278. Coleman v. State, 226 S.E.2d 911, 913 (Ga. 1976).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Ross, supra note 268, at 113 (highlighting facts of Alday murders); see also Coleman,
226 S.E.2d at 913 (detailing sequence and manner of killings).
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The town was seething.2 2 The defendants exhibited no re-
morse.21 In fact, one defendant testified that another defendant
laughed at one of the helpless victims who had begged for mercy
during the slaughter.2s  Summarizing the community's desire for
vengeance, the town sheriff stated publicly, "[I]f I had my way about
it, I'd have me a large oven and I'd precook [the defendants] for
several days, just keep them alive and let them punish [sic] .... And
I don't think that would satisfy me."21 Each defendant's attorney
moved for a change of venue to safeguard their clients' constitutional
right to a fair trial.286  These motions were all denied.287  Subse-
quently, the defendants were found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to death.2'a The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions, the sentences, and the trial judge's refusals to grant
defendants' motions for change of venue.8 9
After the federal district court denied their habeas petitions, the
condemned petitioners filed for and received habeas corpus relief in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.290 Ruling that the trial judge
abused his discretion by not granting the change of venue and that
the Georgia Supreme Court erred in not reversing on this issue, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded the cases for new trials. 291 This action
sparked massive protest in Georgia, and more than 100,000 people
signed a petition to impeach the federal judges who reversed the
292convictions.
In retrospect, a clearer case for change of venue is difficult to
imagine.293 In criminal cases, a change of venue is proper if the
court in which the case takes place determines that the defendant(s)
282. SeeRoss, supra note 268, at 113 (stating that "the murder of the popular family outraged
the town").
283. See Ross, supra note 268, at 113 (commenting on Billy Isaacs' trial testimony concerning
his brother's callousness about the crime).
284. Ross, supra note 268, at 113 (citing Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1498 (11th Cir.
1985)).
285. Ross, supra note 268, at 118 (quoting statements of sheriff Dan White to Albany Herald
noted by Eleventh Circuit in Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1501).
286. Ross, supra note 268, at 114.
287. Ross, supra note 268, at 113.
288. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985).
289. Id. at 1483 n.3 (citing Dungee v. State, 227 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 986
(1976); Issacs v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (per curiam) (Ga.), cert. denied; 429 U.S. 986 (1976);
Coleman v. State, 226 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. 1976), cert. denid, 431 U.S. 909 (1977)).
290. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985); Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482,
1483 7 nn.1-4 (11th Cir. 1985).
291. Isaacs, 778 F.2d at 1484 (ruling that it was prejudicial and erroneous for Georgia state
court to deny defendants' change of venue motions).
292. Ross, supra note 268, at 114.
293. See Ross, supra note 268, at 114 (alluding to Georgia state court's erroneous decision
not to move case out ofjurisdiction).
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cannot receive a fair trial because of prejudice.2"4 The trial judge
and the Georgia Supreme Court justices must have known that the
defendants would not receive a fair trial if they remained in Georgia.
These judges, however, also must have known that the public wanted
the defendants to die for their deeds."5 They understood that if
they granted the defendants' motions, their fates in the nextjudicial
election would have been sealed.296
Why did the state and federal courts come to conflicting conclu-
sions on the venue issue? A former Georgia judge frankly provided
a one word answer-politics. 2 7  Pointing out that Georgia state
judges are directly accountable to the public through regular
elections, the former judge stated that he was not surprised that
neither the trial judge nor the Georgia Supreme Court moved the
trial of the Alday murderers.98 If the case had been moved, these
judges' careers would have been in jeopardy. These Georgia judges
crumbled under the political tide and ignored the law in the name of
preserving their jobs.2t Other judges have not capitulated to the
winds of politics; they have attempted to remain insulated from the
will of the majority." Unfortunately, many of these judges are
voted out of office for doing what they are supposed to do, namely,
applying the law in a neutral and fair manner.
294. See Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1489 (explaining that change of venue standards derive from
constitutional concern for trial by impartiajury and require that when trial court cannot "seat
an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or an inflamed community
atmosphere," the court must grant motion for change of venue).
295. See Ross, supra note 268, at 114 ("The sensational nature of the case and the publicity
it generated made a hostile public attitude foreseeable."). For a detailed recounting of the
"saturation of publicity" that preceded the Alday murder trials, see Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d
at 1491-1537. The court in Coleman concluded that the Donadsville community was
undoubtedly "overwhelmed and saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory publicity." Id. at
1539.
296. See Ross, supra note 268, at 114 (postulating that despite knowledge that change of
venue was appropriate, judges refused to move case out of fear that vengeful community would
retaliate at polls).
297. Alex Crumbley, Alday Outrage Should Prompt Changes ATLANTA CoNST., Dec. 22, 1985,
at DI.
298. Ross, supra note 268, at 114.
299. See Douglas W. Vick, PoorhouseJustie: Underfunded Indigent Defense Serices and Arbitrary
Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L REV. 329, 460 n.323 (1995) (providing examples ofjudges voted out
of office because of their anti-death penalty positions).
300. See Ross, supra note 268, at 115-16 (highlighting episodes in which judges in criminal
cases have followed the law and not the majority and found themselves voted out in the next
election). See also Bright & Keenan, supra note 275, at 763 (discussing recent plight of Texas
district court judge who was voted out of office after setting aside a death sentence in a post
conviction hearing); id. at 765 ("[W] hen presiding over a highly publicized capital case, ajudge
who declines to [impose] death, or who insists on upholding the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign
his own political death warrant.").
THE AMERICAN UmWEsriy LAw REVIEW [Vol. 45:1403
The story of ex-California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird
is a prime example. In the 1986 California judicial elections, the
incumbent Bird was opposed by a right-wing campaign that targeted
Bird's record of reversing death penalty sentences3 0' The challeng-
ers attacked Chief Justice Bird with commercials designed to arouse
resentment in the community. 2  One commercial depicted a
mother looking at a picture of her young daughter and crying out
that, if not for Bird, her daughter would still be alive-falsely
suggesting that murderers whose death sentences were reversed by
Bird were free and out on the streets killing again."03 This under-
handed tactic worked, and Bird was soon voted out of office in a
recall election by a two-to-one margin. 0" Bird was not the only one
to lose her seat. Justices Grodin and Reynoso, Bird's associatejustices,
also were voted out in the same election. 5 All three California
justices fell victim to politics. In speaking of the political beast,
former California Supreme CourtJustice Otto Kaus said:
I'm afraid the era of retaining judges on the basis of their charac-
ter, without tallying up their votes, is a thing of the past. There's
no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political conse-
quences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make
them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile
in your bathtub. 6
Former Florida Supreme Court Justice Rosemary Barkett would
probably agree with Justice Klaus' statement.3 7 Barkett recently
endured bitter Senate confirmation hearings on her nomination to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.' Proclaiming that Barkett
was a "liberal who coddles criminals," Republicans blasted her for an
alleged refusal to invoke the death penalty."° Observing that "it is
vital that the President nominate judges.., who view law and order
as something more than just a slogan," republican presidential
hopeful Bob Dole sought to block Barkett's appointment310
Further, Senator Strom Thurmond questioned Barkett's refusal to
301. Paul Reidinger, The Politics ofJudging, 73 A.BA J. 52, 53 (Apr. 1987).




306. Ross, supra note 268, at 118.
307. See Paul Anderson, Barkett Caught in Senate Cross-Fire over Cii ne, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1,
1994, at IA (describing scathing Senate hearings endured by Barkett in attempt to secure federal
court of appeals judgeship).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2A.
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impose death in certain cases in which death was viciously inflict-
ed."' Barkett ultimately passed the Senate's scrutiny and currently
sits on the Eleventh Circuit."' Unlike Justice Bird, she was able to
withstand the political heat focused on her death penalty record.
It is against this backdrop that Chief Justice Exum of the North
Carolina Supreme Court was asked recently whether elected state
judges can survive if they sometimes overturn death sentences.1
Rephrasing the question to read "Is political death the inevitable
consequence of opposing capital punishment?" Chief Justice Exum
responded that it had become increasingly difficult for state judges to
rule properly on capital cases.3 14 He described a recent case in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a death sentence
for obvious constitutional error relating to preemptory challenges.
31 5
In protest, a prominent local newspaper printed a scathing article
coupled with an editorial cartoon suggesting that ChiefJustice Exum
and his colleagues on the North Carolina Supreme Court were
chipping away at the roots of North Carolina's judicial system.1
The ChiefJustice warned that "feeding the frenzy" generated by this
sort ofjoumalism could soon lead to the downfall of state judges who
continued to overrule death sentences.317  Concluding that he
311. See id. (discussing Thurmond's comment that Barkett's death penalty record was
"strange").
312. See George F. Will, Injustice on the Bench, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 1996, at 19A
(reflecting that Barkett won confirmation despite politically unpopular death penalty opinions
in past cases).
313. See Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process
Survive the Perceived PoliticalPressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. UJ. 239, 270 (1994) (discussingjudicial
opinion of role politics plays in death penalty cases at American Bar Association death penalty
conference).
314. Id. at 270-72. ChiefJustice Exum said that his 1986 campaign for the slot of Chief
Judge was predicated on the death penalty. I&t at 271. His opponent sought to win the election
by emphasizingJustice Exum's personal disdain for the death penalty. It. The ChiefJustice was
able to fend off his challenger by informing the public that he had voted to sustain many capital
sentences imposed by North Carolina's trial courts. It.
315. Idat 272. During voir dire, the defense challenged a potential juror for cause because
the juror was confused about the State's duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The
challenge was denied. Id. Defendant removed this juror peremptorily, thereby exhausting its
peremptory challenges. ItL Therefore, the defense was later unable to peremptorily challenge
another juror who wound up sitting on the case. lIt The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the trial judge erred in not granting defendant's initial challenge for cause. It. Further,
this constituted harmful error because it led to a "juror sitting on the case who was unacceptable
to defendant" and who defense would have been able to remove, absent the trial judge's error.
rd.
316. Id. at 272-73. The cartoon depicted a briefcase on which the words "confidence in the
North Carolina judicial system" were written. Id. at 273. Menacing over the briefcase was Chief
Justice Exum, hatchet in hand, poised to smash the briefcase to pieces. Id.
317. Id.; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lauyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835, 1856-58 (1994) (illuminating how trial judges
appoint inadequate counsel to represent capital defendants so that prosecution has better
chance ofsecuring sentence of death and so thatjudge mollifies political backers who voted him
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would not seek reelection when his term expires in 1998, Exum
admitted that he was "glad [he did not] have to run again."
3 18
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Limit Overrides to Situations in Which Juries Impose Death
The best way to cleanse the process by which trial judges in Florida
and Alabama override jury life recommendations is for both states'
statutes to be struck down by the Supreme Court or repealed by the
respective state legislatures. As previously developed, the rationale
used in Harris to uphold the override statute is inconsistent with
twenty years of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The Court's prior emphasis on guided discretion and
meticulous consideration of the defendant's individual characteristics
was disregarded in Harris. The Harris case is an aberration in which
the Court endorsed unbridled judicial discretion.
In addition to its theoretical deficiencies, the jury override is
impractical. In Florida, for example, the override is terribly ineffi-
cient. In the twenty-year span since the Florida override was enacted
in 1973, seventy-five percent of overrides ofjury life recommendations
have been reversed by the Florida Supreme Court. 1 9 Moreover, it
derogates the jury's role as the representative voice of the communi-
ty 320 Jurors are far more representative of their communities than
judges, who tend to be wealthy white males.3 "2 In addition, if the
judge overrides the jury's life recommendation, jurors may become
onto bench to crack down on crime). Professor Bright conceptualized the problem that politics
plays in the appointed counsel realm as follows:
[Jiudges either are intentionally appointing lawyers who are not equal to the task or
are completely inept at securing competent counsel in capital cases. The reality is that
popularly elected judges, confronted by a local community that is outraged over the
murder of a prominent citizen or angered by the facts of a crime, have little incentive
to protect the constitutional rights of the one accused in such a killing. Many state
judges are former prosecutors who won their seats on the bench by exploiting high-
publicity death penalty cases. Some of those judges have not yet given up the
prosecutorial attitude.
Bright, supra, at 1857; cf. Ross, supra note 268, at 114-15 (asserting that softness on death penalty
is not only issue voters focus on when ousting judicial officers and providing examples of
magistrates and judges who lost in re-election bids because opponents successfully labeled them
"soft on crime" in campaign advertisements).
318. See Symposium, supra note 313, at 273.
319. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 205 (analyzing inefficiency of Florida jury
override procedure).
320. See Radelet, supra note 4, at 1425 (postulating that jurors are insulted when judge
overrides their collective judgment).
321. See Russell, supra note 1, at 43-44 (containing chart illustrating wide disparities between
judges and citizens in terms of race, age, education, and income).
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resentful of the judge and regret participating in a case in which they
believe an erroneous death sentence has been rendered. 22 Florida
State Senator Ed Dunn spoke candidly of the pressing need to re-draft
Florida's capital sentencing scheme. Dunn argued:
It's not honorable for [the legislature] not to [fix] the system when
we know, we have reason to know, that it's not working .... We
have a duty as legislators in my opinion to fix that part of the
system because we ought to know from statistics alone that it's not
right. We ought to know when we compare the eighty-two [death
penalty] cases in Florida with what is being done throughout the
country, that something's awry in Florida . . . . Now I don't
subscribe to the proposition that the standard enunciated by the
Florida Supreme Court is even working. It obviously isn't work-
ing.
323
There is even more reason to eliminate Alabama's override procedure
than there is to abolish Florida's. First, because there is no override
standard or degree of weight assigned to an Alabamajury recommen-
dation, Alabama trial judges randomly and arbitrarily have assigned
their own divergent standards to jury life recommendations.3 24 This
is a clear indication that Alabama trial judges lack the statutory
guidance to channel their authority effectively. As demonstrated, this
lack of guidance has led to the arbitrary imposition of death
sentences. Further, on a pragmatic level, there is no effective
appellate review of death overrides in Alabama. Not once has an
Alabama reviewing court taken issue with a trial judge's decision to
disregard the jury's life recommendation. 325  For example, in four
separate cases, Alabama trial judges have overridden unanimous jury
recommendations that a capital defendant's life be spared;126 the
cases were all affirmed on appeal. Thus, in four cases, four separate
322. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 204 ("Under [the] Tedder [standard], if ajudge
overrides ajury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge is not-so-implicitly stating that
the jury is not composed of 'reasonable people.' This message may not be well-received by
jurors, who may ... regret their participation in what turns out to be a case where a death
sentence that they believe is morally unjustified is imposed.").
323. Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 75.
324. See supra notes 244-67 and accompanying text (outlining confusion that exists in
Alabama due to lack of override standard).
325. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text (detailing meager review conducted by
Alabama appellate courts in life-to-death override cases).
326. See Carr v. State, 640 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. 1994); Sentencing Order, State
v. Crowe, No. CC-83-2727 (Cir. Ct.Jefferson County, Ala.Jan. 6, 1994); Sentencing Order, State
v. Tomlin, No. CC89-000481 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Oct. 26, 1988); Sentencing Order,
State v. Freeman, No. CC-83-1449FB (Cir. Ct. Madison County, Ala. Sept. 6, 1984); Russell, supra
note 1, at 33 (chartingjury vote counts in cases in which judges imposed death over jury life
recommendations); see also Alabama Prison Project, AlabamaJury Override Information Sheet
(June 1995) (on file with The American University Law Review) (charting overridden jury life
recommendations and providing that four unanimous life recommendations were disregarded).
THE AMERICAN UNvERsTy LAw REVIEW [Vol. 45:1403
juries, each comprised of twelve people, unanimously decided that a
capital defendant should live. Their collective judgments were
accorded absolutely no weight by the courts of Alabama. This is not
justice.
B. Limit Use of Override to Reducing Jury Recommendations of
Death-to-Life
If the override procedure is neither ruled unconstitutional nor
repealed, the best alternative is to limit its use to instances where the
jury recommends death and the trial judge invokes the override to
spare the defendant's life. Presently, the override is overwhelmingly
used to impose death over jury recommendations of life. 27 As
Justice Stevens suggested, the lack of death-to-life overrides compared
to the frequency of life-to-death overrides leads, "as a practical
matter," to giving the prosecutor "two chances to obtain a death
sentence." 28 Justice Stevens contends that this violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.329 This inadequacy can
be cured if the judge is obligated to honorjury life recommendations,
but not jury death recommendations. The rationale behind this is
sound. "[P] ermitting ajudge to reject death and grant life is justified.
The community sometimes becomes inflamed on debatable facts, and
raises the hue and cry for vengeance. Thejudge should be permitted
to act as a detached overseer to restrain passion-numbed judg-
ments."' " The Florida Supreme Court bolstered this view in the
first post-Furman override case it heard. Considering the legitimacy
of a death-to-life override, the court in State v. Dixon"'1 opined that
this use of the override was valid because "the inflamed emotions of
jurors can no longer sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in
the light of judicial experience."3 2 The Florida Supreme Court
327. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 5. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1995) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (observing
that in Alabama, judicial override has been used to grant mercy to defendants five times, as
compared to 47 instances wherejudge imposed death sentence overjury life recommendation);
see also Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 213 (stating that in Florida, between 1972 and 1992,
there were 3.6 times as many life-to-death overrides (134) as there have been death-to-life
overrides (37)). These numbers indicate the reality of Alabama's and Florida's death penalty
schemes. The bottom line is that some defendants whom the community would spare have been
sentenced to death. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1039-41 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
328. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
329. U.S. CONSr. amend. V. The DoubleJeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
in relevant part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb .... " Id.
330. Joseph W. Little, Another View, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 200, 204 (1984).
331. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
332. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973).
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expressly endorsed the use of judicial overrides to review jury
recommendations of death." 3 Justice Stevens claims that this view
is consistent with the belief that the legislative decision to authorize
an override was intended to insulate capital defendants from a
prejudicial jury decision to impose the penalty of death.
3
3
Professors Michael Radelet and Michael Mello look to the decision
of the court in Dixon and Justice Stevens' reasoning to support their
theory that the logic of the override is effective only when applied to
cases in which the trial judge uses the override to lessen the jury's
recommendation of death.38 5 They contend that the logic of death-
to-life overrides is firmly embedded in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence.3 36 They assert that "Anglo-American legal traditions" have
consistently treated the prosecution and defense differently: these
traditions give the defendant the benefit of any doubt in a criminal
proceeding.337  This is the reason why the Model Penal Code
envisions a death penalty statute where jury recommendations of life,
but not death, are binding on the trial judge."s In sum, the power
to override death recommendations aligns with our system of criminal
jurisprudence as conceptualized by the fifteenth-centuryjurist SirJohn
Fortescue: "[I]ndeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty
persons should escape the punishment of death, than that one
innocent person should be condemned, and suffer capitally." 39
Limiting the use of the override to death-to-life situations would
abolish trial judges' powers to override life but not death recom-
mendations, creating an asymmetry tending toward mercy' Such
an asymmetry, however, is nothing new in the death penalty are-
na.s4' As Professors Radelet and Mello point out, asymmetry in the
capital sentencing realm has been endorsed in the aggravating and
mitigating factors context.' The U.S. and Florida Supreme Courts
limit capital sentencers' consideration of aggravating factors to only
333. I.
334. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 n.6 (1995) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
335. Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 207-08.
336. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 205-06 ("In contrast to life-to-death overrides,
procedures allowing for death-to-life overrides have a logic that is firmly rooted in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.").
337. Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 206 (noting that Anglo-American "traditions give
the benefit of any sizeable doubt to the defendant").
338. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt.7 (1980).
339. J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 94 (F. Gregor trans., 1874).
340. But see Radelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 206 (justifying this asymmetry as "weighted
on the side of mercy" because it comports with notion that defendant garners all benefits of
doubt in criminal proceedings (quoting Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 960 (11th Cir. 1983))).
341. See Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 67.
342. Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 67.
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those that are statutorily enumerated. 3  On the other hand, in
their penalty determination, capital sentencers are obligated to
consider any possible mitigating circumstance, whether included in
the capital sentencing statute or not.3" This scenario creates an
asymmetry toward mercy that is in accordance with the basic notions
of our system of criminaljustice. Along the same lines,judges in both
capital and noncapital cases may acquit a defendant despite a jury
verdict finding the defendant guilty.' " There is no provision,
however, whereby ajudge can impose guilt on the defendant after the
jury has rendered a not guilty verdict. If this fundamental principle
were applied in the penalty phase of capital cases, judges could only
use the override to extend mercy to the capital defendant. The
override should be used in this manner.
C. The Deference Test
In the alternative to the foregoing, the Tedder standard should be
abolished and a new deference test should be formulated and
incorporated into both Alabama's and Florida's capital sentencing
statutes. Simply requiring Alabama to adopt Tedder would be
problematic because, as indicated, Tedder is the cornerstone of a
Florida override procedure that is functionally an exercise in
futility.3" Moreover, as Professor Joseph Colquitt noted, the Florida
Supreme Court has frequently ignored Tedderwhile reviewing cases in
which trial judges imposed death sentences over jury recommenda-
tions of life imprisonment. 7  In addition, Professor Colquitt
criticized Tedder's "no reasonable person could differ" language.
48
Colquitt noted that under Tedder, ajudge's decision to disregard the
343. See Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1977).
344. SeeRadelet & Mello, supra note 152, at 207 n.61 ("The U.S. Constitution mandates that
the capital sentencer be permitted to consider and give independent mitigating weight to any
relevant mitigating circumstances, even if not enumerated in the capital statute."); see also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) ("'[We conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as
a mitigatingfator, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" (quoting
Locket 438 U.S. at 604)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (striking down death penalty
statute because it unconstitutionally blocked sentencer from considering nonstatutory mitigating
factors).
345. Mello & Robson, supra note 107, at 67.
346. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text (explaining why Tedder standard has
failed).
347. SeeColquitt, supra note 159, at327-28. Professor Colquitt identifies the cases ofDobbert
v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976), affd, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18,
20 (Fla. 1976), and Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976), as three cases in which the
Florida Supreme Court reviewed life-to-death overrides but failed to mention Tedder. Id.
348. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 327.
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jury's recommendation means that the jury is comprised of twelve
unreasonable people. 9  If the jury is comprised of reasonable
people, strict adherence to Tedderwould literally prevent a trial judge
from ever disagreeing with the jury's recommended punishment
35 0
Professor Colquitt suggested requiring "a reasonable basis" for a
judge's decision to override a jury's recommendation.351 Such a
standard would be easier to comprehend and analyze objectively on
appeal than the Tedder "no reasonable person could differ" stan-
dard.5 2
Along the same lines as Professor Colquitt's proposed modifica-
tions, Professor Russell has suggested a two-pronged "Tedder plus stan-
dard." 53 First, the jury's recommended verdict would be treated
with "presumptive weight."5 4 Second, "where the facts suggesting
a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that no reasonable
person could differ or where facts unknown to the jury [contained in
the judge's pre-sentence report] enhance the existing aggravating
circumstance (s), such that a sentence of death is appropriate," the
trial judge could permissibly use the override.55
Both Professor Colquitt's and Professor Russell's theories improve
on Tedder, but not enough to ensure that the override is applied in a
consistent and nonarbitrary manner. A better proposal would be to:
(1) require the jury to produce written reports of the aggravating and
mitigating factors it found to exist;5 6 (2) require the jury to indicate
how it arrived at its penalty recommendation by requiring it to record
how it weighed mitigating and aggravating factors in relation to one
another; 57 (3) incorporate into the statute a standard which pro-
349. See Colquitt, supra note 159, at 327 (postulating that judge's decision to override jury
life verdict under Tedder translates into assertion that jurors are unreasonable people).
350. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 327.
351. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 328.
352. Colquitt, supra note 159, at 328.
353. Russell, supra note 1, at 41.
354. Russell, supra note 1, at 41.
355. Russell, supra note 1, at 41.
356. In another proposed standard to which Alabama courts could adhere in the override
context, Russell suggested that the jury be required to make written findings as to aggravating
and mitigating factors. Russell, supra note 1, at 41. She stated that the findings would then be
analyzed by the experienced judge to see whether the jury's recommendation should be
followed. Id. Currently neither Alabama's nor Florida's capital sentencing statute requires the
jury to make written findings as to the aggravating and mitigating factors it finds to exist. They
both obligate the jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance and provide that the jury
cannot recommend death unless it deems that the aggravating factor(s) found outweigh any
mitigating factors found to exist. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(2)
(1991).
357. The U.S. Constitution does not require that the jury state how it weighed aggravating
and mitigating factors. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989) (ruling thatjury need
not make specific findings regarding its reasons for imposing death sentence).
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vides that the trial judge may not reject the jury's recommended
punishment unless the jury had no rational basis for (a) finding
certain aggravating and/or mitigating factors to exist, and (b)
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors as it did. This
deference test would present a steep challenge for those judges
seeking to reject the jury's recommendation. This test would also
lead to more effective appellate review of cases in which overrides
occur. The appellate courts would have access to both the jury's and
the judge's written findings. This would lead to a more objective and
realistic review of death sentences imposed by ajury override.
CONCLUSION
In Harris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Alabama's jury override statute. The Court's ruling is problem-
atic for several reasons. First, the decision is anomalous to and
inconsistent with twenty years of existing Supreme Court Eighth
Amendmentjurisprudence. Second, the decision disregards practical
evidence that the override is completely inefficient. Third, the
decision ignores the pervasive judicial confusion surrounding the
implementation of the override. Fourth, the decision creates a
jurisprudential means by which political motivations, judicial biases,
and public sentiment may be interjected into the sacrosanct realm of
capital sentencing. Finally, the Court's decision in Harris derogates
the jury, the sole voice of public sentiment, to a role inconsistent with
American jurisprudential notions of fairness, equity and justice. For
these reasons, the override must be overridden.
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